Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making.
Emerging evidence suggests that the long-established distinction between habit-based and goal-directed decision-making mechanisms can also be sustained in humans. Although the habit-based system has been extensively studied in humans, the goal-directed system is less well characterized. This review...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2008
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| _version_ | 1797080354023014400 |
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| author | Shea, N Krug, K Tobler, P |
| author_facet | Shea, N Krug, K Tobler, P |
| author_sort | Shea, N |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Emerging evidence suggests that the long-established distinction between habit-based and goal-directed decision-making mechanisms can also be sustained in humans. Although the habit-based system has been extensively studied in humans, the goal-directed system is less well characterized. This review brings to that task the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual representational mechanisms. Conceptual representations are structured out of semantic constituents (concepts)--the use of which requires an ability to perform some language-like syntactic processing. Decision making--as investigated by neuroscience and psychology--is normally studied in isolation from questions about concepts as studied in philosophy and cognitive psychology. We ask what role concepts play in the "goal-directed" decision-making system. We argue that one fruitful way of studying this system in humans is to investigate the extent to which it deploys conceptual representations. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:58:48Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:8902a24a-3a2e-49d6-8020-55b176bf42c5 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T00:58:48Z |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:8902a24a-3a2e-49d6-8020-55b176bf42c52022-03-26T22:21:29ZConceptual representations in goal-directed decision making.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:8902a24a-3a2e-49d6-8020-55b176bf42c5EnglishSymplectic Elements at Oxford2008Shea, NKrug, KTobler, PEmerging evidence suggests that the long-established distinction between habit-based and goal-directed decision-making mechanisms can also be sustained in humans. Although the habit-based system has been extensively studied in humans, the goal-directed system is less well characterized. This review brings to that task the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual representational mechanisms. Conceptual representations are structured out of semantic constituents (concepts)--the use of which requires an ability to perform some language-like syntactic processing. Decision making--as investigated by neuroscience and psychology--is normally studied in isolation from questions about concepts as studied in philosophy and cognitive psychology. We ask what role concepts play in the "goal-directed" decision-making system. We argue that one fruitful way of studying this system in humans is to investigate the extent to which it deploys conceptual representations. |
| spellingShingle | Shea, N Krug, K Tobler, P Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making. |
| title | Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making. |
| title_full | Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making. |
| title_fullStr | Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making. |
| title_short | Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making. |
| title_sort | conceptual representations in goal directed decision making |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT shean conceptualrepresentationsingoaldirecteddecisionmaking AT krugk conceptualrepresentationsingoaldirecteddecisionmaking AT toblerp conceptualrepresentationsingoaldirecteddecisionmaking |