Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management
This paper considers a problem in which an agent is hired to manage a capital investment and subsequently receives private information regarding the productivity of the capital investment. The capital manager must decide whether to invest capital supplied by the firm (the principal), or to divert th...
Главные авторы: | Noe, T, Nachman, D |
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Формат: | Journal article |
Опубликовано: |
1995
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