Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management
This paper considers a problem in which an agent is hired to manage a capital investment and subsequently receives private information regarding the productivity of the capital investment. The capital manager must decide whether to invest capital supplied by the firm (the principal), or to divert th...
Main Authors: | Noe, T, Nachman, D |
---|---|
格式: | Journal article |
出版: |
1995
|
相似書籍
-
Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management
由: Noe, T, et al.
出版: (1995) -
Output, employment, capital, and growth : a quantitative analysis /
由: 462763 Brems, Hans
出版: (1973) -
Early output quasi-delay-insensitive array multipliers
由: Balasubramanian, Padmanabhan, et al.
出版: (2019) -
The structure and evolution of production, employment and human capital in Portugal: an input‑output approach
由: João Carlos Lopes, et al.
出版: (2013-12-01) -
The Visualized Employment Contract. An Exploratory Study on Contract Visualization in Danish Employment Contracts
由: Maria Jose Schmidt-Kessen, et al.
出版: (2021-10-01)