Nagasawa’s 'Maximal God' and the ontological argument
Yujin Nagasawa’s ambitious and ingenious book, Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism (2017), culminates with defences of two different versions of the Ontological Argument, based respectively on the “Classical” version of Saint Anselm (in Chapters 5 and 6) and the “Modal” version of Alv...
| Autor Principal: | |
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| Formato: | Journal article |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
2023
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| _version_ | 1826316081723080704 |
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| author | Millican, P |
| author_facet | Millican, P |
| author_sort | Millican, P |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Yujin Nagasawa’s ambitious and ingenious book, Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being
Theism (2017), culminates with defences of two different versions of the Ontological Argument, based
respectively on the “Classical” version of Saint Anselm (in Chapters 5 and 6) and the “Modal” version
of Alvin Plantinga (in Chapter 7). Nagasawa’s approach to both of these is novel and interesting, but in
both cases, I shall argue, his attempted defence fails – the Ontological Argument remains powerless to
give any support whatever to the claim that a “perfect being” exists. Having argued against each of his
arguments individually (in §1 and §2 respectively), I shall end (in §3) by drawing some general – and
highly negative – conclusions regarding the prospects for any successful Ontological Argument. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:02:16Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:8a60c626-c28e-4a76-8d42-53419376681c |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-09T03:37:30Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:8a60c626-c28e-4a76-8d42-53419376681c2024-12-03T09:09:40ZNagasawa’s 'Maximal God' and the ontological argumentJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:8a60c626-c28e-4a76-8d42-53419376681cEnglishSymplectic ElementsCambridge University Press2023Millican, PYujin Nagasawa’s ambitious and ingenious book, Maximal God: A New Defence of Perfect Being Theism (2017), culminates with defences of two different versions of the Ontological Argument, based respectively on the “Classical” version of Saint Anselm (in Chapters 5 and 6) and the “Modal” version of Alvin Plantinga (in Chapter 7). Nagasawa’s approach to both of these is novel and interesting, but in both cases, I shall argue, his attempted defence fails – the Ontological Argument remains powerless to give any support whatever to the claim that a “perfect being” exists. Having argued against each of his arguments individually (in §1 and §2 respectively), I shall end (in §3) by drawing some general – and highly negative – conclusions regarding the prospects for any successful Ontological Argument. |
| spellingShingle | Millican, P Nagasawa’s 'Maximal God' and the ontological argument |
| title | Nagasawa’s 'Maximal God' and the ontological argument |
| title_full | Nagasawa’s 'Maximal God' and the ontological argument |
| title_fullStr | Nagasawa’s 'Maximal God' and the ontological argument |
| title_full_unstemmed | Nagasawa’s 'Maximal God' and the ontological argument |
| title_short | Nagasawa’s 'Maximal God' and the ontological argument |
| title_sort | nagasawa s maximal god and the ontological argument |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT millicanp nagasawasmaximalgodandtheontologicalargument |