Rethinking the epistemic case against epistocracy
In this article, I focus on arguments which suggest that disenfranchising persons on the grounds of incompetence is likely to produce epistemically sub-optimal decisions. I suggest three ways in which such arguments can be strengthened. First, I argue that they can be untethered from the controversi...
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| Format: | Journal article |
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Routledge
2018
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| _version_ | 1797080660714717184 |
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| author | Bhatia, U |
| author_facet | Bhatia, U |
| author_sort | Bhatia, U |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | In this article, I focus on arguments which suggest that disenfranchising persons on the grounds of incompetence is likely to produce epistemically sub-optimal decisions. I suggest three ways in which such arguments can be strengthened. First, I argue that they can be untethered from the controversial ‘best judge’ principle, according to which each person is the best judge of his or her own interests. Second, I suggest that epistemic arguments against epistocracy are currently insensitive to the nature of the groups that would be excluded on the grounds of incompetence. Such arguments would remain unchanged were epistocracy to disenfranchise privileged persons rather than already disadvantaged persons. I argue that a stronger critique of epistocracy ought to focus on distinctive epistemic obstacles faced by socially privileged persons. Third, I argue that current epistemic critics of epistocracy ignore how its basis for exclusion entails consequences that are relevant to our assessment of its justifiability. Their criticisms would, for instance, remain the same had this exclusion been brought about in a random manner. Instead, I emphasise the deliberative costs that follow from the exclusion of disadvantaged groups qua incompetent. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:03:16Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:8a708def-a946-47c3-b69f-0d82a207381f |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:03:16Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Routledge |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:8a708def-a946-47c3-b69f-0d82a207381f2022-03-26T22:31:34ZRethinking the epistemic case against epistocracyJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:8a708def-a946-47c3-b69f-0d82a207381fSymplectic Elements at OxfordRoutledge2018Bhatia, UIn this article, I focus on arguments which suggest that disenfranchising persons on the grounds of incompetence is likely to produce epistemically sub-optimal decisions. I suggest three ways in which such arguments can be strengthened. First, I argue that they can be untethered from the controversial ‘best judge’ principle, according to which each person is the best judge of his or her own interests. Second, I suggest that epistemic arguments against epistocracy are currently insensitive to the nature of the groups that would be excluded on the grounds of incompetence. Such arguments would remain unchanged were epistocracy to disenfranchise privileged persons rather than already disadvantaged persons. I argue that a stronger critique of epistocracy ought to focus on distinctive epistemic obstacles faced by socially privileged persons. Third, I argue that current epistemic critics of epistocracy ignore how its basis for exclusion entails consequences that are relevant to our assessment of its justifiability. Their criticisms would, for instance, remain the same had this exclusion been brought about in a random manner. Instead, I emphasise the deliberative costs that follow from the exclusion of disadvantaged groups qua incompetent. |
| spellingShingle | Bhatia, U Rethinking the epistemic case against epistocracy |
| title | Rethinking the epistemic case against epistocracy |
| title_full | Rethinking the epistemic case against epistocracy |
| title_fullStr | Rethinking the epistemic case against epistocracy |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rethinking the epistemic case against epistocracy |
| title_short | Rethinking the epistemic case against epistocracy |
| title_sort | rethinking the epistemic case against epistocracy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bhatiau rethinkingtheepistemiccaseagainstepistocracy |