Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US.
This paper incorporates Nash bargaining, credible bargaining and efficiency wages as special cases of an over-arching model of wage determination in a matching model that is used to assess econometrically how well each fits US data. With Nash bargaining, estimates for worker bargaining power and th...
| Asıl Yazarlar: | , |
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| Materyal Türü: | Working paper |
| Dil: | English |
| Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2010
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| _version_ | 1826283739289747456 |
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| author | Malcomson, J Mavroeidis, S |
| author_facet | Malcomson, J Mavroeidis, S |
| author_sort | Malcomson, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | This paper incorporates Nash bargaining, credible bargaining and efficiency wages as special cases of an over-arching model of wage determination in a matching model that is used to assess econometrically how well each fits US data. With Nash bargaining, estimates for worker bargaining power and the value of non-work activity are almost identical to those calibrated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). However, the over-identifying restrictions are overwhelmingly rejected statistically, as they are for credible bargaining. Efficiency wages fit the data better, with the over-identifying restrictions not rejected statistically, and result in a lower, more plausible estimated value of non-work activity. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:03:25Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:8a7ec1e7-bb3a-4f4f-8708-49876a3e527d |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:03:25Z |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | Department of Economics (University of Oxford) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:8a7ec1e7-bb3a-4f4f-8708-49876a3e527d2022-03-26T22:31:57ZNash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:8a7ec1e7-bb3a-4f4f-8708-49876a3e527dEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsDepartment of Economics (University of Oxford)2010Malcomson, JMavroeidis, SThis paper incorporates Nash bargaining, credible bargaining and efficiency wages as special cases of an over-arching model of wage determination in a matching model that is used to assess econometrically how well each fits US data. With Nash bargaining, estimates for worker bargaining power and the value of non-work activity are almost identical to those calibrated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). However, the over-identifying restrictions are overwhelmingly rejected statistically, as they are for credible bargaining. Efficiency wages fit the data better, with the over-identifying restrictions not rejected statistically, and result in a lower, more plausible estimated value of non-work activity. |
| spellingShingle | Malcomson, J Mavroeidis, S Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US. |
| title | Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US. |
| title_full | Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US. |
| title_fullStr | Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US. |
| title_short | Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US. |
| title_sort | nash bargaining credible bargaining and efficiency wages in a matching model for the us |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT malcomsonj nashbargainingcrediblebargainingandefficiencywagesinamatchingmodelfortheus AT mavroeidiss nashbargainingcrediblebargainingandefficiencywagesinamatchingmodelfortheus |