Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US.
This paper incorporates Nash bargaining, credible bargaining and efficiency wages as special cases of an over-arching model of wage determination in a matching model that is used to assess econometrically how well each fits US data. With Nash bargaining, estimates for worker bargaining power and th...
Những tác giả chính: | Malcomson, J, Mavroeidis, S |
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Định dạng: | Working paper |
Ngôn ngữ: | English |
Được phát hành: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2010
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