Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US.
This paper incorporates Nash bargaining, credible bargaining and efficiency wages as special cases of an over-arching model of wage determination in a matching model that is used to assess econometrically how well each fits US data. With Nash bargaining, estimates for worker bargaining power and th...
| Những tác giả chính: | , |
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| Định dạng: | Working paper |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2010
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Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US
Được phát hành 2012
Journal article
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Nash bargaining, credible bargaining and efficiency wages in a matching model for the US
Được phát hành 2010
Working paper