| Tóm tắt: | This dissertation contributes to the literature on the politics of social assistance in Emerging Market Economies. It builds upon existing theoretical frameworks across several academic fields and offers empirical evidence on the influence of politics in the expansion and distribution of social assistance programs. Paper 1 provides a novel contribution to existing political explanations of social assistance expansion by theorizing and testing how electoral competition and contentious politics mediate each other’s effect on social assistance spending on a global scale. The analysis finds this election-contention-nexus to influence social assistance spending in Middle-income countries in particular. Paper 2 offers a longitudinal analysis of the influence of the interaction of protests and electoral competition on social assistance in Turkey to uncover how the election-contention-nexus plays out at the national level. In addition, due to the available micro-data, it assesses the targeting of programs to characterize who receives benefits as a response to political factors. The results suggest that this co-occurrence can lead to higher levels of coverage of social assistance benefits among the poor in Turkey. Paper 3 introduces a framework to examine differences in the distributional logic used by governments across different social assistance types to provide a systematic understanding of political distribution of benefits that goes beyond aggregate spending or single flagship programs. The results suggest that the main benefit types that are used for political purposes in Turkey are meager cash and in-kind benefits that I classify as poverty mitigating social assistance. Further, the type of challenging party is found to have differential effects on the distribution of social assistance programs. Lastly, Paper 4 examines the role of federal politics in India to explain stark differences in unmet demand for the world’s largest public works program. It finds that state-level party strategy and party alignment across levels of government are important factors that can explain unmet demand in the program. Further, it highlights that one benefit can be utilized by many political actors across levels of governments for different purposes. Surprisingly, district-level economic or political dynamics are not found to influence rationing rates of the public works program.
|
|---|