Can brain scans prove criminals unaccountable?

Leonard Berlin (2014) reports that neuroscientific data have been presented in court by lawyers wishing to argue that their clients have reduced or absent moral responsibility for their behaviour because their brain function is impaired. Berlin cites evidence showing that such neuroscientific data c...

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Main Author: Roache, R
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Taylor and Francis 2014
Subjects:
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author Roache, R
author_facet Roache, R
author_sort Roache, R
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description Leonard Berlin (2014) reports that neuroscientific data have been presented in court by lawyers wishing to argue that their clients have reduced or absent moral responsibility for their behaviour because their brain function is impaired. Berlin cites evidence showing that such neuroscientific data can influence judges to pass more lenient sentences, and he anticipates that advances in “the neurology of criminal behavior” may lead courts to view certain criminals as having reduced accountability for their actions. Similarly, an advisor to President Obama recently predicted a surge in the number of U.S. defendants appealing to neuroscientific data in criminal court cases in an attempt to reduce sentences and strike out confessions, and commented that this strategy has already been successful in some cases (Sample 2013). Berlin, and those whose comments he quotes, note that the neuroscience behind criminal behavior is in its infancy. Many of the neuroimaging techniques he considers are experimental or otherwise unproven, and their results are subject to interpretation. I wish to raise the additional point that the ability to prove criminals unaccountable on the basis of neuroimaging does not depend merely on our understanding of the brain and the availability of reliable imaging techniques, but also—crucially—on answers to philosophical questions about the relationship between brain activity and free will. I give two reasons for believing that brain scans cannot show criminals to be unaccountable, or less accountable. First, even where their brains look and function differently to the brains of normal people—in this context, healthy noncriminals—this does not itself entail that criminals are less morally responsible for their behavior than normal people. Second, since there is substantial disagreement about what neuroscience can in general tell us about free will, we should not expect it to tell us anything useful about criminals’ free will.
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spelling oxford-uuid:8c38b374-6dbf-4c48-8b62-eaad6ea3a5572022-03-26T22:43:18ZCan brain scans prove criminals unaccountable?Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:8c38b374-6dbf-4c48-8b62-eaad6ea3a557Ethics (Moral philosophy)Ethics of the biosciencesPhilosophyPractical ethicsEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetTaylor and Francis2014Roache, RLeonard Berlin (2014) reports that neuroscientific data have been presented in court by lawyers wishing to argue that their clients have reduced or absent moral responsibility for their behaviour because their brain function is impaired. Berlin cites evidence showing that such neuroscientific data can influence judges to pass more lenient sentences, and he anticipates that advances in “the neurology of criminal behavior” may lead courts to view certain criminals as having reduced accountability for their actions. Similarly, an advisor to President Obama recently predicted a surge in the number of U.S. defendants appealing to neuroscientific data in criminal court cases in an attempt to reduce sentences and strike out confessions, and commented that this strategy has already been successful in some cases (Sample 2013). Berlin, and those whose comments he quotes, note that the neuroscience behind criminal behavior is in its infancy. Many of the neuroimaging techniques he considers are experimental or otherwise unproven, and their results are subject to interpretation. I wish to raise the additional point that the ability to prove criminals unaccountable on the basis of neuroimaging does not depend merely on our understanding of the brain and the availability of reliable imaging techniques, but also—crucially—on answers to philosophical questions about the relationship between brain activity and free will. I give two reasons for believing that brain scans cannot show criminals to be unaccountable, or less accountable. First, even where their brains look and function differently to the brains of normal people—in this context, healthy noncriminals—this does not itself entail that criminals are less morally responsible for their behavior than normal people. Second, since there is substantial disagreement about what neuroscience can in general tell us about free will, we should not expect it to tell us anything useful about criminals’ free will.
spellingShingle Ethics (Moral philosophy)
Ethics of the biosciences
Philosophy
Practical ethics
Roache, R
Can brain scans prove criminals unaccountable?
title Can brain scans prove criminals unaccountable?
title_full Can brain scans prove criminals unaccountable?
title_fullStr Can brain scans prove criminals unaccountable?
title_full_unstemmed Can brain scans prove criminals unaccountable?
title_short Can brain scans prove criminals unaccountable?
title_sort can brain scans prove criminals unaccountable
topic Ethics (Moral philosophy)
Ethics of the biosciences
Philosophy
Practical ethics
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