The ethics of human life extension: the second argument from evolution
One argument that is sometimes made against pursuing radical forms of human life extension is that such interventions will make the species less evolvable, which would be morally undesirable. In this paper I discuss the empirical and evaluative claims of this argument. I argue that radical increases...
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| Format: | Journal article |
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Oxford University Press
2015
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| _version_ | 1826284514657173504 |
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| author | Gyngell, C |
| author_facet | Gyngell, C |
| author_sort | Gyngell, C |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | One argument that is sometimes made against pursuing radical forms of human life extension is that such interventions will make the species less evolvable, which would be morally undesirable. In this paper I discuss the empirical and evaluative claims of this argument. I argue that radical increases in life expectancy could, in principle, reduce the evolutionary potential of human populations through both biological and cultural mechanisms. I further argue that if life extension did reduce the evolvability of the species this will be undesirable for three reasons: (1) it may increase the species’ susceptibility to extinction risks, (2) it may adversely affect institutions and practises that promote well-being, and (3) it may impede moral progress. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:14:59Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:8e582133-eff4-4a09-8d9b-f2617645b717 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:14:59Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:8e582133-eff4-4a09-8d9b-f2617645b7172022-03-26T22:57:08ZThe ethics of human life extension: the second argument from evolutionJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:8e582133-eff4-4a09-8d9b-f2617645b717Symplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2015Gyngell, COne argument that is sometimes made against pursuing radical forms of human life extension is that such interventions will make the species less evolvable, which would be morally undesirable. In this paper I discuss the empirical and evaluative claims of this argument. I argue that radical increases in life expectancy could, in principle, reduce the evolutionary potential of human populations through both biological and cultural mechanisms. I further argue that if life extension did reduce the evolvability of the species this will be undesirable for three reasons: (1) it may increase the species’ susceptibility to extinction risks, (2) it may adversely affect institutions and practises that promote well-being, and (3) it may impede moral progress. |
| spellingShingle | Gyngell, C The ethics of human life extension: the second argument from evolution |
| title | The ethics of human life extension: the second argument from evolution |
| title_full | The ethics of human life extension: the second argument from evolution |
| title_fullStr | The ethics of human life extension: the second argument from evolution |
| title_full_unstemmed | The ethics of human life extension: the second argument from evolution |
| title_short | The ethics of human life extension: the second argument from evolution |
| title_sort | ethics of human life extension the second argument from evolution |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gyngellc theethicsofhumanlifeextensionthesecondargumentfromevolution AT gyngellc ethicsofhumanlifeextensionthesecondargumentfromevolution |