International R&D; Rivalry and Industrial Strategy without Government Commitment.

International R&D; Rivalry and Industrial Strategy without Government Commitment.

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We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D; and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home e...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Leahy, D, Neary, J
Format:	Working paper
Language:	English
Published:	CEPR 1995

International R&D; Rivalry and Industrial Strategy without Government Commitment.

International R&D; Rivalry and Industrial Strategy without Government Commitment. by Leahy, D, Neary, J

Published 1996

Journal article

International R&D; rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment

International R&D; rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment by Leahy, D, Neary, J

Published 1996

Journal article