The grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism
The supervenience argument against non-reductive moral realism threatens to rule out the existence of irreducibly normative properties by establishing that for every normative property there is a corresponding non-normative property that is necessarily co-extensive with it. This paper first consider...
Main Author: | Bader, R |
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Format: | Book section |
Published: |
Oxford University Press
2016
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