Bargaining and wage rigidity in a matching model for the US
This paper uses robust econometric methods to assess previous empirical results for the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching model. Assuming all wages are negotiated each period is inconsistent with the history dependence in US wages, even allowing for heterogeneous match productivities, time to...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
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Wiley
2017
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| _version_ | 1826284973431193600 |
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| author | Malcomson, J Mavroeidis, S |
| author_facet | Malcomson, J Mavroeidis, S |
| author_sort | Malcomson, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | This paper uses robust econometric methods to assess previous empirical results for the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching model. Assuming all wages are negotiated each period is inconsistent with the history dependence in US wages, even allowing for heterogeneous match productivities, time to build vacancies and credible bargaining. Flexible wages for job changers, with rigid wages for job stayers, allows the model to capture this history dependence and is not inconsistent with parameter calibrations in the literature. Such wage rigidity affects only the timing of wage payments over the duration of matches; conclusions about other characteristics are unaffected by it. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:21:53Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:90a4e76f-b436-4943-9af3-f1de0159fd9a |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:21:53Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:90a4e76f-b436-4943-9af3-f1de0159fd9a2022-03-26T23:13:09ZBargaining and wage rigidity in a matching model for the USJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:90a4e76f-b436-4943-9af3-f1de0159fd9aSymplectic Elements at OxfordWiley2017Malcomson, JMavroeidis, SThis paper uses robust econometric methods to assess previous empirical results for the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching model. Assuming all wages are negotiated each period is inconsistent with the history dependence in US wages, even allowing for heterogeneous match productivities, time to build vacancies and credible bargaining. Flexible wages for job changers, with rigid wages for job stayers, allows the model to capture this history dependence and is not inconsistent with parameter calibrations in the literature. Such wage rigidity affects only the timing of wage payments over the duration of matches; conclusions about other characteristics are unaffected by it. |
| spellingShingle | Malcomson, J Mavroeidis, S Bargaining and wage rigidity in a matching model for the US |
| title | Bargaining and wage rigidity in a matching model for the US |
| title_full | Bargaining and wage rigidity in a matching model for the US |
| title_fullStr | Bargaining and wage rigidity in a matching model for the US |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bargaining and wage rigidity in a matching model for the US |
| title_short | Bargaining and wage rigidity in a matching model for the US |
| title_sort | bargaining and wage rigidity in a matching model for the us |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT malcomsonj bargainingandwagerigidityinamatchingmodelfortheus AT mavroeidiss bargainingandwagerigidityinamatchingmodelfortheus |