Philosophical 'intuitions' and scepticism about judgement
1. What are called 'intuitions' in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. 2. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us int...
Príomhchruthaitheoir: | Williamson, T |
---|---|
Rannpháirtithe: | European Society for Analytic Philosophy |
Formáid: | Journal article |
Teanga: | English |
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2004
|
Ábhair: |
Míreanna comhchosúla
-
Philosophical 'intuitions' and scepticism about judgement
de réir: Williamson, T
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: (2004) -
Skill and scepticism: an enquiry concerning the nature and epistemic value of intuitive judgement
de réir: Grève, S
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: (2018) -
Scepticism and evidence
de réir: Williamson, T
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: (2000) -
Scepticism at sea: Herman Melville and philosophical doubt
de réir: Evans, D, et al.
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: (2013) -
On scepticism, neutrality and the social contract
de réir: Carroll, I
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: (2006)