Philosophical 'intuitions' and scepticism about judgement
1. What are called 'intuitions' in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. 2. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us int...
Glavni autor: | Williamson, T |
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Daljnji autori: | European Society for Analytic Philosophy |
Format: | Journal article |
Jezik: | English |
Izdano: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2004
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Teme: |
Slični predmeti
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Philosophical 'intuitions' and scepticism about judgement
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Scepticism and evidence
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Scepticism at sea: Herman Melville and philosophical doubt
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On scepticism, neutrality and the social contract
od: Carroll, I
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