Philosophical 'intuitions' and scepticism about judgement
1. What are called 'intuitions' in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. 2. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us int...
Tác giả chính: | Williamson, T |
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Tác giả khác: | European Society for Analytic Philosophy |
Định dạng: | Journal article |
Ngôn ngữ: | English |
Được phát hành: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2004
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Những chủ đề: |
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