Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making

Emerging evidence suggests that the long-established distinction between habit-based and goal-directed decision-making mechanisms can also be sustained in humans. Although the habit-based system has been extensively studied in humans, the goal-directed system is less well characterized. This review...

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Main Authors: Shea, N, Krug, K, Tobler, P
Other Authors: Psychonomic Society
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Springer 2008
Subjects:
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author Shea, N
Krug, K
Tobler, P
author2 Psychonomic Society
author_facet Psychonomic Society
Shea, N
Krug, K
Tobler, P
author_sort Shea, N
collection OXFORD
description Emerging evidence suggests that the long-established distinction between habit-based and goal-directed decision-making mechanisms can also be sustained in humans. Although the habit-based system has been extensively studied in humans, the goal-directed system is less well characterized. This review brings to that task the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual representational mechanisms. Conceptual representations are structured out of semantic consituents (concepts) - the use of which requires an ability to perform some language-like syntactic processing. Decision making - as investigated by neuroscience and psychology - is normally studied in isolation from questions about concepts as studied in philosophy and cognitive psychology. We ask what role concepts play in the "goal-directed" decision-making systems. We argue that one fruitful way of studying this system in humans is to investigate the extent to which it deploys conceptual representations.
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spelling oxford-uuid:911cfa57-6520-46d6-b9c4-05ab82090cc82022-03-26T23:16:27ZConceptual representations in goal-directed decision makingJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:911cfa57-6520-46d6-b9c4-05ab82090cc8PhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetSpringer2008Shea, NKrug, KTobler, PPsychonomic SocietyEmerging evidence suggests that the long-established distinction between habit-based and goal-directed decision-making mechanisms can also be sustained in humans. Although the habit-based system has been extensively studied in humans, the goal-directed system is less well characterized. This review brings to that task the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual representational mechanisms. Conceptual representations are structured out of semantic consituents (concepts) - the use of which requires an ability to perform some language-like syntactic processing. Decision making - as investigated by neuroscience and psychology - is normally studied in isolation from questions about concepts as studied in philosophy and cognitive psychology. We ask what role concepts play in the "goal-directed" decision-making systems. We argue that one fruitful way of studying this system in humans is to investigate the extent to which it deploys conceptual representations.
spellingShingle Philosophy
Shea, N
Krug, K
Tobler, P
Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making
title Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making
title_full Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making
title_fullStr Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making
title_full_unstemmed Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making
title_short Conceptual representations in goal-directed decision making
title_sort conceptual representations in goal directed decision making
topic Philosophy
work_keys_str_mv AT shean conceptualrepresentationsingoaldirecteddecisionmaking
AT krugk conceptualrepresentationsingoaldirecteddecisionmaking
AT toblerp conceptualrepresentationsingoaldirecteddecisionmaking