In defence of logical nominalism: reply to Leftow
<p style="text-align:justify;"> This paper defends (especially in response to Brian Leftow's recent attack) logical nominalism, the thesis that logically necessary truth belongs primarily to sentences and depends solely on the conventions of human language. A sentence is logica...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | Swinburne, R |
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Μορφή: | Journal article |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Cambridge University Press
2010
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