Learning within rational-expectations equilibrium
Models of macroeconomic learning are populated by agents who possess a great deal of knowledge of the "true" structure of the economy, and yet ignore the impact of their own learning on that structure; they may learn about an equilibrium, but they do not learn within it. An alternative le...
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| Format: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
2012
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| _version_ | 1797082918059769856 |
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| author | Norman, T |
| author_facet | Norman, T |
| author_sort | Norman, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Models of macroeconomic learning are populated by agents who possess a great deal of knowledge of the "true" structure of the economy, and yet ignore the impact of their own learning on that structure; they may learn about an equilibrium, but they do not learn within it. An alternative learning model is presented where agents' decisions are informed by hypotheses they hold regarding the economy. They periodically test these hypotheses against observed data, and replace them if they fail. It is shown that agents who learn in this way spend almost all of the time approximating rational-expectations equilibria. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:34:44Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:94c0e3e5-ab59-4d74-b20c-76c3aef11fed |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:34:44Z |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publisher | University of Oxford |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:94c0e3e5-ab59-4d74-b20c-76c3aef11fed2022-03-26T23:41:38ZLearning within rational-expectations equilibriumWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:94c0e3e5-ab59-4d74-b20c-76c3aef11fedBulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2012Norman, TModels of macroeconomic learning are populated by agents who possess a great deal of knowledge of the "true" structure of the economy, and yet ignore the impact of their own learning on that structure; they may learn about an equilibrium, but they do not learn within it. An alternative learning model is presented where agents' decisions are informed by hypotheses they hold regarding the economy. They periodically test these hypotheses against observed data, and replace them if they fail. It is shown that agents who learn in this way spend almost all of the time approximating rational-expectations equilibria. |
| spellingShingle | Norman, T Learning within rational-expectations equilibrium |
| title | Learning within rational-expectations equilibrium |
| title_full | Learning within rational-expectations equilibrium |
| title_fullStr | Learning within rational-expectations equilibrium |
| title_full_unstemmed | Learning within rational-expectations equilibrium |
| title_short | Learning within rational-expectations equilibrium |
| title_sort | learning within rational expectations equilibrium |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT normant learningwithinrationalexpectationsequilibrium |