Cyber-warranties as a quality signal for information security products

Consumers struggle to distinguish between the quality of different enterprise security products. Evaluating performance is complicated by the stochastic nature of losses. It is recognised that this information asymmetry may lead to a "market for lemons" in which suppliers face no incentive...

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Main Authors: Woods, D, Simpson, A
Format: Conference item
Published: Springer 2018
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author Woods, D
Simpson, A
author_facet Woods, D
Simpson, A
author_sort Woods, D
collection OXFORD
description Consumers struggle to distinguish between the quality of different enterprise security products. Evaluating performance is complicated by the stochastic nature of losses. It is recognised that this information asymmetry may lead to a "market for lemons" in which suppliers face no incentive to provide higher quality products. Some security vendors have begun to offer cyber-warranties - voluntary ex-ante obligations to indemnify the customer in the event of a cyber attack - to function as a quality signal. Much like how consumer protection laws are relatively more costly to firms offering low quality products, cyberwarranties are more costly for firms developing low quality enterprise security products. In this paper, we introduce a decision-theoretic model to explore how consumers might use cyber-warranties to increase information when purchasing security products. Our analysis derives four inferences that consumers can make about a security product. We discuss the difficulties customers might face in using these inferences to make real world decisions.
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spelling oxford-uuid:94e20739-19b8-4798-a7f2-bdb95c36f0a92022-03-26T23:42:30ZCyber-warranties as a quality signal for information security productsConference itemhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794uuid:94e20739-19b8-4798-a7f2-bdb95c36f0a9Symplectic Elements at OxfordSpringer2018Woods, DSimpson, AConsumers struggle to distinguish between the quality of different enterprise security products. Evaluating performance is complicated by the stochastic nature of losses. It is recognised that this information asymmetry may lead to a "market for lemons" in which suppliers face no incentive to provide higher quality products. Some security vendors have begun to offer cyber-warranties - voluntary ex-ante obligations to indemnify the customer in the event of a cyber attack - to function as a quality signal. Much like how consumer protection laws are relatively more costly to firms offering low quality products, cyberwarranties are more costly for firms developing low quality enterprise security products. In this paper, we introduce a decision-theoretic model to explore how consumers might use cyber-warranties to increase information when purchasing security products. Our analysis derives four inferences that consumers can make about a security product. We discuss the difficulties customers might face in using these inferences to make real world decisions.
spellingShingle Woods, D
Simpson, A
Cyber-warranties as a quality signal for information security products
title Cyber-warranties as a quality signal for information security products
title_full Cyber-warranties as a quality signal for information security products
title_fullStr Cyber-warranties as a quality signal for information security products
title_full_unstemmed Cyber-warranties as a quality signal for information security products
title_short Cyber-warranties as a quality signal for information security products
title_sort cyber warranties as a quality signal for information security products
work_keys_str_mv AT woodsd cyberwarrantiesasaqualitysignalforinformationsecurityproducts
AT simpsona cyberwarrantiesasaqualitysignalforinformationsecurityproducts