The two-tier problem
A number of philosophers argue for a Two-Tier view: that there is some difference between individual-affecting and non-individual affecting choices. But it is challenging to know the degree of moral difference, and to determine for some cases into which category they fall. I refer to this as the “Tw...
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| Formáid: | Journal article |
| Teanga: | English |
| Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
Brill Academic Publishers
2024
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| Achoimre: | A number of philosophers argue for a Two-Tier view: that there is some difference between
individual-affecting and non-individual affecting choices. But it is challenging to know the
degree of moral difference, and to determine for some cases into which category they fall. I
refer to this as the “Two Tier problem”.
In this paper, I develop and defend a “Two-Tier Deontic View”. On that view, the higher tier
applies to a subset of individual-affecting cases. We have stronger reason to bring about an
individual-affecting rather than a non-individual affecting benefit, but only in cases where
we have agent-relative duties to the individuals so-affected. In other cases (and I argue that
this applies to most policy decisions affecting reproduction) there is no moral difference
between individual and non-individual affecting choices. |
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