Condorcet winning sets.
An alternative is said to be a Condorcet winner of an election if it is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of voters. While this is a very attractive solution concept, many elections do not have a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we propose a set-valued relaxation of this concept, whic...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal article |
| Published: |
Springer Verlag
2014
|
| _version_ | 1826286169740017664 |
|---|---|
| author | Elkind, E Lang, J Saffidine, A |
| author_facet | Elkind, E Lang, J Saffidine, A |
| author_sort | Elkind, E |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | An alternative is said to be a Condorcet winner of an election if it is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of voters. While this is a very attractive solution concept, many elections do not have a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we propose a set-valued relaxation of this concept, which we call a Condorcet winning set: such sets consist of alternatives that collectively dominate any other alternative. We also consider a more general version of this concept, where instead of domination by a majority of voters we require domination by a given fraction (Formula presented.) of voters; we refer to such sets as (Formula presented.)-winning sets. We explore social choice-theoretic and algorithmic aspects of these solution concepts, both theoretically and empirically. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:39:47Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:96752702-2ec4-4a0f-a09c-38fe0f489604 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:39:47Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publisher | Springer Verlag |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:96752702-2ec4-4a0f-a09c-38fe0f4896042022-03-26T23:53:01ZCondorcet winning sets.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:96752702-2ec4-4a0f-a09c-38fe0f489604Symplectic Elements at OxfordSpringer Verlag2014Elkind, ELang, JSaffidine, AAn alternative is said to be a Condorcet winner of an election if it is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of voters. While this is a very attractive solution concept, many elections do not have a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we propose a set-valued relaxation of this concept, which we call a Condorcet winning set: such sets consist of alternatives that collectively dominate any other alternative. We also consider a more general version of this concept, where instead of domination by a majority of voters we require domination by a given fraction (Formula presented.) of voters; we refer to such sets as (Formula presented.)-winning sets. We explore social choice-theoretic and algorithmic aspects of these solution concepts, both theoretically and empirically. |
| spellingShingle | Elkind, E Lang, J Saffidine, A Condorcet winning sets. |
| title | Condorcet winning sets. |
| title_full | Condorcet winning sets. |
| title_fullStr | Condorcet winning sets. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Condorcet winning sets. |
| title_short | Condorcet winning sets. |
| title_sort | condorcet winning sets |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT elkinde condorcetwinningsets AT langj condorcetwinningsets AT saffidinea condorcetwinningsets |