Assessing arguments from moral objectivity for God's existence
<p>Most moral arguments for theism claim that the best answers as to whether objective moral properties are reducible, what they might reduce to, whether their instantiation is explainable, and what might do the explaining, are provided by theological voluntarism. Theists have two major argume...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2020
|
| Subjects: |
| _version_ | 1797083513809272832 |
|---|---|
| author | Dunkley Smith, M |
| author2 | Leal, D |
| author_facet | Leal, D Dunkley Smith, M |
| author_sort | Dunkley Smith, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>Most moral arguments for theism claim that the best answers as to whether objective moral properties are reducible, what they might reduce to, whether their instantiation is explainable, and what might do the explaining, are provided by theological voluntarism. Theists have two major arguments for preferring the reductive version of voluntarism to the reduction of moral properties to natural properties. The first holds that if moral properties reduce to natural properties, there must be a particular conceptual connection between moral concepts and natural concepts. The charge is that this connection is absent. The second holds that if moral properties reduce to natural properties, moral properties must supervene on natural properties in the right way. The charge is that they do not so supervene. Theists also have a prominent argument for preferring the causal version of voluntarism to non-reductionist views of moral properties. It holds that voluntarism provides a deeper and simpler explanatory stopping point. </p>
<p>I argue that all three arguments fail to show an advantage for voluntarism. There is no conceptual connection that is plausibly a requirement on reduction that excludes natural properties and permits theistic properties. Theists cannot show that natural properties fail to satisfy the supervenience requirement without leaving voluntarism vulnerable to a powerful objection. And causal voluntarism requires positing at least one brute moral fact about God’s moral authority. Non-reductive views can also posit one brute fact – one about the respect due to persons. And attempts to show that voluntarism’s one brute fact has greater internal simplicity fail. Since theists have not shown voluntarism to have advantages over particular competitors, they have not shown voluntarism to have advantages over all competitors. Hence it is not been shown that voluntarism provides the best answers to questions about the reduction and explanation of moral properties. </p>
|
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:42:40Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oxford-uuid:97650e55-fb40-4050-9330-d5d168e3a761 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:42:40Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:97650e55-fb40-4050-9330-d5d168e3a7612022-03-26T23:59:16ZAssessing arguments from moral objectivity for God's existenceThesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06uuid:97650e55-fb40-4050-9330-d5d168e3a761philosophy of religionmeta-ethicsEnglishHyrax Deposit2020Dunkley Smith, MLeal, DCrisp, R<p>Most moral arguments for theism claim that the best answers as to whether objective moral properties are reducible, what they might reduce to, whether their instantiation is explainable, and what might do the explaining, are provided by theological voluntarism. Theists have two major arguments for preferring the reductive version of voluntarism to the reduction of moral properties to natural properties. The first holds that if moral properties reduce to natural properties, there must be a particular conceptual connection between moral concepts and natural concepts. The charge is that this connection is absent. The second holds that if moral properties reduce to natural properties, moral properties must supervene on natural properties in the right way. The charge is that they do not so supervene. Theists also have a prominent argument for preferring the causal version of voluntarism to non-reductionist views of moral properties. It holds that voluntarism provides a deeper and simpler explanatory stopping point. </p> <p>I argue that all three arguments fail to show an advantage for voluntarism. There is no conceptual connection that is plausibly a requirement on reduction that excludes natural properties and permits theistic properties. Theists cannot show that natural properties fail to satisfy the supervenience requirement without leaving voluntarism vulnerable to a powerful objection. And causal voluntarism requires positing at least one brute moral fact about God’s moral authority. Non-reductive views can also posit one brute fact – one about the respect due to persons. And attempts to show that voluntarism’s one brute fact has greater internal simplicity fail. Since theists have not shown voluntarism to have advantages over particular competitors, they have not shown voluntarism to have advantages over all competitors. Hence it is not been shown that voluntarism provides the best answers to questions about the reduction and explanation of moral properties. </p> |
| spellingShingle | philosophy of religion meta-ethics Dunkley Smith, M Assessing arguments from moral objectivity for God's existence |
| title | Assessing arguments from moral objectivity for God's existence |
| title_full | Assessing arguments from moral objectivity for God's existence |
| title_fullStr | Assessing arguments from moral objectivity for God's existence |
| title_full_unstemmed | Assessing arguments from moral objectivity for God's existence |
| title_short | Assessing arguments from moral objectivity for God's existence |
| title_sort | assessing arguments from moral objectivity for god s existence |
| topic | philosophy of religion meta-ethics |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT dunkleysmithm assessingargumentsfrommoralobjectivityforgodsexistence |