Hume as regularity theorist – after all! Completing a counter-revolution
Traditionally, Hume has widely been viewed as the standard-bearer for regularity accounts of causation. But between 1983 and 1990, two rival interpretations appeared – namely the sceptical realism of Wright, Craig, and Strawson, and the quasi-realist projectivism of Blackburn – and since then the in...
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
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Duke University Press
2024
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author | Millican, P |
author_facet | Millican, P |
author_sort | Millican, P |
collection | OXFORD |
description | Traditionally, Hume has widely been viewed as the standard-bearer for regularity accounts of causation.
But between 1983 and 1990, two rival interpretations appeared – namely the sceptical realism of Wright,
Craig, and Strawson, and the quasi-realist projectivism of Blackburn – and since then the interpretative
debate has been dominated by the contest between these three approaches, with projectivism recently
appearing the likely winner. This paper argues that the controversy arose from a fundamental mistake,
namely, the assumption that Hume is committed to the subjectivity of our conception of causal necessity.
The paper explains how that assumption generated tensions within the regularity account, which the
sceptical realist and quasi-realist alternatives, in very different ways, purported to resolve. But a broader
and more balanced view of the textual evidence, taking due account of the relatively neglected sections
where Hume applies the results of his analysis, tells strongly in favour of an objectivist regularity view,
both in respect of causation and causal necessity. Despite some complications, the upshot is a far more
straightforward reading of Hume than those that have hitherto dominated this long-running debate. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:47:11Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:97cac752-0582-4dfb-abf5-95e163b92792 |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-09-25T04:07:22Z |
publishDate | 2024 |
publisher | Duke University Press |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:97cac752-0582-4dfb-abf5-95e163b927922024-05-31T09:24:52ZHume as regularity theorist – after all! Completing a counter-revolutionJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:97cac752-0582-4dfb-abf5-95e163b92792EnglishSymplectic ElementsDuke University Press2024Millican, PTraditionally, Hume has widely been viewed as the standard-bearer for regularity accounts of causation. But between 1983 and 1990, two rival interpretations appeared – namely the sceptical realism of Wright, Craig, and Strawson, and the quasi-realist projectivism of Blackburn – and since then the interpretative debate has been dominated by the contest between these three approaches, with projectivism recently appearing the likely winner. This paper argues that the controversy arose from a fundamental mistake, namely, the assumption that Hume is committed to the subjectivity of our conception of causal necessity. The paper explains how that assumption generated tensions within the regularity account, which the sceptical realist and quasi-realist alternatives, in very different ways, purported to resolve. But a broader and more balanced view of the textual evidence, taking due account of the relatively neglected sections where Hume applies the results of his analysis, tells strongly in favour of an objectivist regularity view, both in respect of causation and causal necessity. Despite some complications, the upshot is a far more straightforward reading of Hume than those that have hitherto dominated this long-running debate. |
spellingShingle | Millican, P Hume as regularity theorist – after all! Completing a counter-revolution |
title | Hume as regularity theorist – after all! Completing a counter-revolution |
title_full | Hume as regularity theorist – after all! Completing a counter-revolution |
title_fullStr | Hume as regularity theorist – after all! Completing a counter-revolution |
title_full_unstemmed | Hume as regularity theorist – after all! Completing a counter-revolution |
title_short | Hume as regularity theorist – after all! Completing a counter-revolution |
title_sort | hume as regularity theorist after all completing a counter revolution |
work_keys_str_mv | AT millicanp humeasregularitytheoristafterallcompletingacounterrevolution |