The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment
Neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making have thus far largely focused on differences between moral judgments with opposing utilitarian (well-being maximizing) and deontological (duty-based) content. However, these studies have investigated moral dilemmas involving extreme situations, and did n...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford University Press
2011
|
| Subjects: |
| _version_ | 1797083687873937408 |
|---|---|
| author | Kahane, G Wiech, K Shackel, N Farias, M Savulescu, J Tracey, I |
| author_facet | Kahane, G Wiech, K Shackel, N Farias, M Savulescu, J Tracey, I |
| author_sort | Kahane, G |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making have thus far largely focused on differences between moral judgments with opposing utilitarian (well-being maximizing) and deontological (duty-based) content. However, these studies have investigated moral dilemmas involving extreme situations, and did not control for two distinct dimensions of moral judgment: whether or not it is intuitive (immediately compelling to most people) and whether it is utilitarian or deontological in content. By contrasting dilemmas where utilitarian judgments are counterintuitive with dilemmas in which they are intuitive, we were able to use functional magnetic resonances imaging to identify the neural correlates of intuitive and counterintuitive judgments across a range of moral situations. Irrespective of content (utilitarian/deontological), counterintuitive moral judgments were associated with greater difficulty and with activation in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting that such judgments may involve emotional conflict; intuitive judgments were linked to activation in the visual and premotor cortex. In addition, we obtained evidence that neural differences in moral judgment in such dilemmas are largely due to whether they are intuitive and not, as previously assumed, to differences between utilitarian and deontological judgments. Our findings therefore do not support theories that have generally associated utilitarian and deontological judgments with distinct neural systems. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:44:59Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:981bf5f0-1390-48ca-9fff-2255b695955a |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:44:59Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:981bf5f0-1390-48ca-9fff-2255b695955a2022-03-27T00:04:43ZThe neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgmentJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:981bf5f0-1390-48ca-9fff-2255b695955aPhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetOxford University Press2011Kahane, GWiech, KShackel, NFarias, MSavulescu, JTracey, INeuroimaging studies on moral decision-making have thus far largely focused on differences between moral judgments with opposing utilitarian (well-being maximizing) and deontological (duty-based) content. However, these studies have investigated moral dilemmas involving extreme situations, and did not control for two distinct dimensions of moral judgment: whether or not it is intuitive (immediately compelling to most people) and whether it is utilitarian or deontological in content. By contrasting dilemmas where utilitarian judgments are counterintuitive with dilemmas in which they are intuitive, we were able to use functional magnetic resonances imaging to identify the neural correlates of intuitive and counterintuitive judgments across a range of moral situations. Irrespective of content (utilitarian/deontological), counterintuitive moral judgments were associated with greater difficulty and with activation in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting that such judgments may involve emotional conflict; intuitive judgments were linked to activation in the visual and premotor cortex. In addition, we obtained evidence that neural differences in moral judgment in such dilemmas are largely due to whether they are intuitive and not, as previously assumed, to differences between utilitarian and deontological judgments. Our findings therefore do not support theories that have generally associated utilitarian and deontological judgments with distinct neural systems. |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Kahane, G Wiech, K Shackel, N Farias, M Savulescu, J Tracey, I The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment |
| title | The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment |
| title_full | The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment |
| title_fullStr | The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment |
| title_full_unstemmed | The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment |
| title_short | The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment |
| title_sort | neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment |
| topic | Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kahaneg theneuralbasisofintuitiveandcounterintuitivemoraljudgment AT wiechk theneuralbasisofintuitiveandcounterintuitivemoraljudgment AT shackeln theneuralbasisofintuitiveandcounterintuitivemoraljudgment AT fariasm theneuralbasisofintuitiveandcounterintuitivemoraljudgment AT savulescuj theneuralbasisofintuitiveandcounterintuitivemoraljudgment AT traceyi theneuralbasisofintuitiveandcounterintuitivemoraljudgment AT kahaneg neuralbasisofintuitiveandcounterintuitivemoraljudgment AT wiechk neuralbasisofintuitiveandcounterintuitivemoraljudgment AT shackeln neuralbasisofintuitiveandcounterintuitivemoraljudgment AT fariasm neuralbasisofintuitiveandcounterintuitivemoraljudgment AT savulescuj neuralbasisofintuitiveandcounterintuitivemoraljudgment AT traceyi neuralbasisofintuitiveandcounterintuitivemoraljudgment |