Good IPOs draw in bad: Inelastic banking capacity and hot markets.

We posit that screening IPOs requires specialized labor which, in the short run, is in xed supply. Hence, a sudden increase in demand for IPO nancing increases the compensation of IPO screening labor. Increased compensation results in reduced screening which encourages sub-marginal rms to enter the...

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Main Authors: Khanna, N, Noe, T, Sonti, R
Format: Working paper
Language:English
Published: Oxford Finance 2008
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author Khanna, N
Noe, T
Sonti, R
author_facet Khanna, N
Noe, T
Sonti, R
author_sort Khanna, N
collection OXFORD
description We posit that screening IPOs requires specialized labor which, in the short run, is in xed supply. Hence, a sudden increase in demand for IPO nancing increases the compensation of IPO screening labor. Increased compensation results in reduced screening which encourages sub-marginal rms to enter the IPO market, further increasing the demand for screening labor and thus its compensation. The model's conclusions are consistent with empirical ndings of increased underpricing during hot markets, positive correlation between issue volume and underpricing, negative correlation between issue volume and information production, and with tipping points between hot and cold markets characterized by discontinuous jumps in volume, underpricing, and issue quality. Finally, the model makes sharp and so far untested predictions relating IPO market conditions both to the fundamental values of IPO rms and to the returns to investment banks and investment banking labor.
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spelling oxford-uuid:98f93e20-ca13-43b2-9a30-91f9184357ad2022-03-27T00:10:57ZGood IPOs draw in bad: Inelastic banking capacity and hot markets.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:98f93e20-ca13-43b2-9a30-91f9184357adEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsOxford Finance2008Khanna, NNoe, TSonti, RWe posit that screening IPOs requires specialized labor which, in the short run, is in xed supply. Hence, a sudden increase in demand for IPO nancing increases the compensation of IPO screening labor. Increased compensation results in reduced screening which encourages sub-marginal rms to enter the IPO market, further increasing the demand for screening labor and thus its compensation. The model's conclusions are consistent with empirical ndings of increased underpricing during hot markets, positive correlation between issue volume and underpricing, negative correlation between issue volume and information production, and with tipping points between hot and cold markets characterized by discontinuous jumps in volume, underpricing, and issue quality. Finally, the model makes sharp and so far untested predictions relating IPO market conditions both to the fundamental values of IPO rms and to the returns to investment banks and investment banking labor.
spellingShingle Khanna, N
Noe, T
Sonti, R
Good IPOs draw in bad: Inelastic banking capacity and hot markets.
title Good IPOs draw in bad: Inelastic banking capacity and hot markets.
title_full Good IPOs draw in bad: Inelastic banking capacity and hot markets.
title_fullStr Good IPOs draw in bad: Inelastic banking capacity and hot markets.
title_full_unstemmed Good IPOs draw in bad: Inelastic banking capacity and hot markets.
title_short Good IPOs draw in bad: Inelastic banking capacity and hot markets.
title_sort good ipos draw in bad inelastic banking capacity and hot markets
work_keys_str_mv AT khannan goodiposdrawinbadinelasticbankingcapacityandhotmarkets
AT noet goodiposdrawinbadinelasticbankingcapacityandhotmarkets
AT sontir goodiposdrawinbadinelasticbankingcapacityandhotmarkets