Metaphysics E1 and the unity of first philosophy

In this thesis I discuss Metaphysics E1 and the problem of the unity of theology and ontology in the Metaphysics. I argue for a unitarian reading of the text, one which largely accepts the transmitted order of the books. I first discuss the programme of E1, which I read in light of a continuously de...

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Main Author: Stooshinoff, A
Other Authors: Judson, R
Format: Thesis
Language:English
Ancient Greek
Published: 2022
Subjects:
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author Stooshinoff, A
author2 Judson, R
author_facet Judson, R
Stooshinoff, A
author_sort Stooshinoff, A
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description In this thesis I discuss Metaphysics E1 and the problem of the unity of theology and ontology in the Metaphysics. I argue for a unitarian reading of the text, one which largely accepts the transmitted order of the books. I first discuss the programme of E1, which I read in light of a continuously developing project in ΑΒΓΔ. I then discuss Aristotle’s counterfactual argument for a ‘first philosophy’. I discuss Aristotle’s justification for the universality of theology, namely that it is “universal because first” E1 1026a29-32. I take this to mean that its objects, the highest beings and highest causes, are causes of the maximal number of effects – all beings – and thus are causes universally. In this way theology is prior to physics and mathematics as established in E1 1026a8-23. I then discuss various objections to the authenticity of E, or to the programme of identifying theology with the universal science of being, notably the view of Natorp that E was both spurious and interpolated, and the view of Jaeger that the theological and ontological ‘parts’ of the Metaphysics belong to different periods of Aristotle’s life. I then return to the unity of theology and ontology, first discussing and objecting to Frede-Patzig’s solution to the problem through pros hen vocality between god and other substances, then discussing and objecting to Judson’s solution to make theology only a part of first philosophy. Finally, I discuss my solution to the problem taking A2 as a guide, while also differentiating my view from Menn’s, arguing that theology is the ultimate aim of wisdom, and that the ontology of the Metaphysics is preparatory for an ultimate theology, but is nonetheless integral to the investigation. And that if there is a disunity between theology and ontology it is only in name, because it is for the theologian or first philosopher to undertake both investigations.
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spelling oxford-uuid:99507994-aaef-45c5-a616-8794f2cb74e52022-10-13T11:33:43ZMetaphysics E1 and the unity of first philosophyThesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdccuuid:99507994-aaef-45c5-a616-8794f2cb74e5philosophymetaphysicsancient philosophyclassicshistory of philosophyEnglishAncient GreekHyrax Deposit2022Stooshinoff, AJudson, RIn this thesis I discuss Metaphysics E1 and the problem of the unity of theology and ontology in the Metaphysics. I argue for a unitarian reading of the text, one which largely accepts the transmitted order of the books. I first discuss the programme of E1, which I read in light of a continuously developing project in ΑΒΓΔ. I then discuss Aristotle’s counterfactual argument for a ‘first philosophy’. I discuss Aristotle’s justification for the universality of theology, namely that it is “universal because first” E1 1026a29-32. I take this to mean that its objects, the highest beings and highest causes, are causes of the maximal number of effects – all beings – and thus are causes universally. In this way theology is prior to physics and mathematics as established in E1 1026a8-23. I then discuss various objections to the authenticity of E, or to the programme of identifying theology with the universal science of being, notably the view of Natorp that E was both spurious and interpolated, and the view of Jaeger that the theological and ontological ‘parts’ of the Metaphysics belong to different periods of Aristotle’s life. I then return to the unity of theology and ontology, first discussing and objecting to Frede-Patzig’s solution to the problem through pros hen vocality between god and other substances, then discussing and objecting to Judson’s solution to make theology only a part of first philosophy. Finally, I discuss my solution to the problem taking A2 as a guide, while also differentiating my view from Menn’s, arguing that theology is the ultimate aim of wisdom, and that the ontology of the Metaphysics is preparatory for an ultimate theology, but is nonetheless integral to the investigation. And that if there is a disunity between theology and ontology it is only in name, because it is for the theologian or first philosopher to undertake both investigations.
spellingShingle philosophy
metaphysics
ancient philosophy
classics
history of philosophy
Stooshinoff, A
Metaphysics E1 and the unity of first philosophy
title Metaphysics E1 and the unity of first philosophy
title_full Metaphysics E1 and the unity of first philosophy
title_fullStr Metaphysics E1 and the unity of first philosophy
title_full_unstemmed Metaphysics E1 and the unity of first philosophy
title_short Metaphysics E1 and the unity of first philosophy
title_sort metaphysics e1 and the unity of first philosophy
topic philosophy
metaphysics
ancient philosophy
classics
history of philosophy
work_keys_str_mv AT stooshinoffa metaphysicse1andtheunityoffirstphilosophy