Must we construct persons?
Christine Korsgaard famously argued that even if we accept the metaphysical theory that there are no selves or persons, practical standpoint requires us to think of ourselves as unified over time. It is the ability to choose and deliberate, make plans and act that requires me to construct an identit...
| Հիմնական հեղինակ: | |
|---|---|
| Ձևաչափ: | Journal article |
| Լեզու: | English |
| Հրապարակվել է: |
Oxford University Press
2025
|
| _version_ | 1826317718048997376 |
|---|---|
| author | Chadha, M |
| author_facet | Chadha, M |
| author_sort | Chadha, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Christine Korsgaard famously argued that even if we accept the metaphysical
theory that there are no selves or persons, practical standpoint requires us to think of
ourselves as unified over time. It is the ability to choose and deliberate, make plans and act
that requires me to construct an identity for myself. This practical requirement is antithetical
to the Buddhist no-self view. Buddhists argue that it is primarily the ignorance about our
identity that is responsible for suffering, and that this ignorance consists not just in having a
false belief in a metaphysical self but also our ordinary self-conception as being unified
across time: our ‘I’-sense, so to say. The Buddhist project of eliminating, or at least reducing,
suffering is concerned with arguments to show that there is no metaphysical self and that the
‘I’-sense is an illusion we must get rid of. If Korsgaard is right, it seems that the Buddhist
project is in deep trouble. I shall argue that Korsgaard's requirement is too strong. The
Buddhist project is sound and Buddhists at all stages of their practice can continue to choose
and deliberate, make plans and act. |
| first_indexed | 2025-03-11T16:58:21Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:99735c0a-8204-4907-ad25-2b8de73463cb |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-03-11T16:58:21Z |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:99735c0a-8204-4907-ad25-2b8de73463cb2025-03-04T12:26:03ZMust we construct persons?Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:99735c0a-8204-4907-ad25-2b8de73463cbEnglishSymplectic ElementsOxford University Press2025Chadha, MChristine Korsgaard famously argued that even if we accept the metaphysical theory that there are no selves or persons, practical standpoint requires us to think of ourselves as unified over time. It is the ability to choose and deliberate, make plans and act that requires me to construct an identity for myself. This practical requirement is antithetical to the Buddhist no-self view. Buddhists argue that it is primarily the ignorance about our identity that is responsible for suffering, and that this ignorance consists not just in having a false belief in a metaphysical self but also our ordinary self-conception as being unified across time: our ‘I’-sense, so to say. The Buddhist project of eliminating, or at least reducing, suffering is concerned with arguments to show that there is no metaphysical self and that the ‘I’-sense is an illusion we must get rid of. If Korsgaard is right, it seems that the Buddhist project is in deep trouble. I shall argue that Korsgaard's requirement is too strong. The Buddhist project is sound and Buddhists at all stages of their practice can continue to choose and deliberate, make plans and act. |
| spellingShingle | Chadha, M Must we construct persons? |
| title | Must we construct persons? |
| title_full | Must we construct persons? |
| title_fullStr | Must we construct persons? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Must we construct persons? |
| title_short | Must we construct persons? |
| title_sort | must we construct persons |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT chadham mustweconstructpersons |