Hume's pivotal argument, and his supposed obligation of reason
Treatise 1.4.1 argues that whenever we assess our probability of error, “we are oblig’d by our reason” to consider also the probability of error in that assessment, leading to a fatal regress which—but for irresistible nature—would extinguish all belief. The argument plays a huge role in the Treatis...
Main Author: | Millican, P |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Duke University Press
2018
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