When to favour your own group? The threats of costly punishments and in-group favouritism

Using a laboratory experiment with minimal groups, we examined the extent to which the threats of costly punishments affect in-group favouritism behaviour. We studied three types of punishment separately: in-group, out-group, and third-party punishments. In line with previous studies, the majority o...

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Main Authors: Harris, D, Herrmann, B, Kontoleon, A
Format: Working paper
Published: University of Oxford 2012
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author Harris, D
Herrmann, B
Kontoleon, A
author_facet Harris, D
Herrmann, B
Kontoleon, A
author_sort Harris, D
collection OXFORD
description Using a laboratory experiment with minimal groups, we examined the extent to which the threats of costly punishments affect in-group favouritism behaviour. We studied three types of punishment separately: in-group, out-group, and third-party punishments. In line with previous studies, the majority of the allocators favoured their own group by allocating more money to each of the in-group members at the expense of the out-group in the baseline without punishment. In the in-group punishment treatment, we observed a slight increase in in-group favouritism behaviour. On the contrary, when only the out-group could punish the allocators, there was a significant drop in in-group favouritism behaviour as well as an increase in the equal division option. Finally, when faced with an independent third-party punisher the allocators continued to favour their own group. The threat of third-party punishment appeared to have no effect on their decisions. Our paper contributes to the literature on in-group favouritism and the nature of social norms by showing that the decision whether to favour one
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spelling oxford-uuid:9af15b4d-4033-4fdf-9bb9-1fc800a857af2022-03-27T00:25:03ZWhen to favour your own group? The threats of costly punishments and in-group favouritismWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:9af15b4d-4033-4fdf-9bb9-1fc800a857afBulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2012Harris, DHerrmann, BKontoleon, AUsing a laboratory experiment with minimal groups, we examined the extent to which the threats of costly punishments affect in-group favouritism behaviour. We studied three types of punishment separately: in-group, out-group, and third-party punishments. In line with previous studies, the majority of the allocators favoured their own group by allocating more money to each of the in-group members at the expense of the out-group in the baseline without punishment. In the in-group punishment treatment, we observed a slight increase in in-group favouritism behaviour. On the contrary, when only the out-group could punish the allocators, there was a significant drop in in-group favouritism behaviour as well as an increase in the equal division option. Finally, when faced with an independent third-party punisher the allocators continued to favour their own group. The threat of third-party punishment appeared to have no effect on their decisions. Our paper contributes to the literature on in-group favouritism and the nature of social norms by showing that the decision whether to favour one
spellingShingle Harris, D
Herrmann, B
Kontoleon, A
When to favour your own group? The threats of costly punishments and in-group favouritism
title When to favour your own group? The threats of costly punishments and in-group favouritism
title_full When to favour your own group? The threats of costly punishments and in-group favouritism
title_fullStr When to favour your own group? The threats of costly punishments and in-group favouritism
title_full_unstemmed When to favour your own group? The threats of costly punishments and in-group favouritism
title_short When to favour your own group? The threats of costly punishments and in-group favouritism
title_sort when to favour your own group the threats of costly punishments and in group favouritism
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