The Value Question in Metaphysics
Much seems to be at stake in metaphysical questions about, for example, God, free will or morality. One thing that could be at stake is the value of the universe we inhabit-how good or bad it is. We can think of competing philosophical positions as describing possibilities, ways the world might turn...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| _version_ | 1797084381754425344 |
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| author | Kahane, G |
| author_facet | Kahane, G |
| author_sort | Kahane, G |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Much seems to be at stake in metaphysical questions about, for example, God, free will or morality. One thing that could be at stake is the value of the universe we inhabit-how good or bad it is. We can think of competing philosophical positions as describing possibilities, ways the world might turn out to be, and to which value can be assigned. When, for example, people hope that God exists, or fear that we do not possess free will, they express attitudes towards these possibilities, attitudes that presuppose answers to questions about their comparative value. My aim in this paper is to distinguish these evaluative questions from related questions with which they can be confused, to identify structural constraints on their proper pursuit, and to address objections to their very coherence. Answers to such evaluative questions offer one measure of the importance of philosophical disputes. © 2012 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:54:38Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:9b4857c6-abbb-49d9-966e-5485453e3a56 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T01:54:38Z |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:9b4857c6-abbb-49d9-966e-5485453e3a562022-03-27T00:27:42ZThe Value Question in MetaphysicsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:9b4857c6-abbb-49d9-966e-5485453e3a56EnglishSymplectic Elements at Oxford2012Kahane, GMuch seems to be at stake in metaphysical questions about, for example, God, free will or morality. One thing that could be at stake is the value of the universe we inhabit-how good or bad it is. We can think of competing philosophical positions as describing possibilities, ways the world might turn out to be, and to which value can be assigned. When, for example, people hope that God exists, or fear that we do not possess free will, they express attitudes towards these possibilities, attitudes that presuppose answers to questions about their comparative value. My aim in this paper is to distinguish these evaluative questions from related questions with which they can be confused, to identify structural constraints on their proper pursuit, and to address objections to their very coherence. Answers to such evaluative questions offer one measure of the importance of philosophical disputes. © 2012 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC. |
| spellingShingle | Kahane, G The Value Question in Metaphysics |
| title | The Value Question in Metaphysics |
| title_full | The Value Question in Metaphysics |
| title_fullStr | The Value Question in Metaphysics |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Value Question in Metaphysics |
| title_short | The Value Question in Metaphysics |
| title_sort | value question in metaphysics |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kahaneg thevaluequestioninmetaphysics AT kahaneg valuequestioninmetaphysics |