Learning in a black box
We study behavior in repeated interactions when agents have no information about the structure of the underlying game and they cannot observe other agents’ actions or payoffs. Theory shows that even when players have no such information, there are simple payoff-based learning rules that lead to Nash...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
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Elsevier
2016
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| _version_ | 1797106510153646080 |
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| author | Nax, H Burton-Chellew, M West, S Young, H |
| author_facet | Nax, H Burton-Chellew, M West, S Young, H |
| author_sort | Nax, H |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We study behavior in repeated interactions when agents have no information about the structure of the underlying game and they cannot observe other agents’ actions or payoffs. Theory shows that even when players have no such information, there are simple payoff-based learning rules that lead to Nash equilibrium in many types of games. A key feature of these rules is that subjects search differently depending on whether their payoffs increase, stay constant or decrease. This paper analyzes learning behavior in a laboratory setting and finds strong confirmation for these asymmetric search behaviors in the context of voluntary contribution games. By varying the amount of information we show that these behaviors are also present even when subjects have full information about the game. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:01:35Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:9d59df71-4ec0-40a9-bfbc-e566ec90dbe2 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:01:35Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:9d59df71-4ec0-40a9-bfbc-e566ec90dbe22022-03-29T17:18:28ZLearning in a black boxJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:9d59df71-4ec0-40a9-bfbc-e566ec90dbe2Symplectic Elements at OxfordElsevier2016Nax, HBurton-Chellew, MWest, SYoung, HWe study behavior in repeated interactions when agents have no information about the structure of the underlying game and they cannot observe other agents’ actions or payoffs. Theory shows that even when players have no such information, there are simple payoff-based learning rules that lead to Nash equilibrium in many types of games. A key feature of these rules is that subjects search differently depending on whether their payoffs increase, stay constant or decrease. This paper analyzes learning behavior in a laboratory setting and finds strong confirmation for these asymmetric search behaviors in the context of voluntary contribution games. By varying the amount of information we show that these behaviors are also present even when subjects have full information about the game. |
| spellingShingle | Nax, H Burton-Chellew, M West, S Young, H Learning in a black box |
| title | Learning in a black box |
| title_full | Learning in a black box |
| title_fullStr | Learning in a black box |
| title_full_unstemmed | Learning in a black box |
| title_short | Learning in a black box |
| title_sort | learning in a black box |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT naxh learninginablackbox AT burtonchellewm learninginablackbox AT wests learninginablackbox AT youngh learninginablackbox |