The evolution of collective action
A public good is produced if and only if a team of m or more volunteers contribute to it. An equilibrium-selection problem leads to the questions: will collective action succeed? If so, who will participate in the team? The paper studies the evolution of collective action: as part of a strategy-revi...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working paper |
| Published: |
University of Oxford
2005
|
| _version_ | 1797085227006296064 |
|---|---|
| author | Myatt, D Wallace, C |
| author_facet | Myatt, D Wallace, C |
| author_sort | Myatt, D |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | A public good is produced if and only if a team of m or more volunteers contribute to it. An equilibrium-selection problem leads to the questions: will collective action succeed? If so, who will participate in the team? The paper studies the evolution of collective action: as part of a strategy-revision process, updating players choose quantal responses to existing play. With symmetric players, success depends upon the cost of contribution, the benefit from provision, and the critical team-size m; the relative variability of costs and benefits, and their correlation, are also critical. When players differ, successful teams consist of either the most efficient contributors, or those with the most idiosyncratic preferences. The addition of a single bad apple (for instance, an individual whose costs are particularly variable) to a population in which a successful team operates may result in destabilisation: over time, the bad apple might supplant an existing contributor, prompting a collapse. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:05:57Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:9effcb85-eddf-4f32-ad25-69df531de62a |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:05:57Z |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publisher | University of Oxford |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:9effcb85-eddf-4f32-ad25-69df531de62a2022-03-27T00:54:04ZThe evolution of collective actionWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:9effcb85-eddf-4f32-ad25-69df531de62aBulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2005Myatt, DWallace, CA public good is produced if and only if a team of m or more volunteers contribute to it. An equilibrium-selection problem leads to the questions: will collective action succeed? If so, who will participate in the team? The paper studies the evolution of collective action: as part of a strategy-revision process, updating players choose quantal responses to existing play. With symmetric players, success depends upon the cost of contribution, the benefit from provision, and the critical team-size m; the relative variability of costs and benefits, and their correlation, are also critical. When players differ, successful teams consist of either the most efficient contributors, or those with the most idiosyncratic preferences. The addition of a single bad apple (for instance, an individual whose costs are particularly variable) to a population in which a successful team operates may result in destabilisation: over time, the bad apple might supplant an existing contributor, prompting a collapse. |
| spellingShingle | Myatt, D Wallace, C The evolution of collective action |
| title | The evolution of collective action |
| title_full | The evolution of collective action |
| title_fullStr | The evolution of collective action |
| title_full_unstemmed | The evolution of collective action |
| title_short | The evolution of collective action |
| title_sort | evolution of collective action |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT myattd theevolutionofcollectiveaction AT wallacec theevolutionofcollectiveaction AT myattd evolutionofcollectiveaction AT wallacec evolutionofcollectiveaction |