Multiwinner candidacy games
In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences over the set of possible election outcomes, and candidates may strategically withdraw from the election in order to manipulate the result in their favor. In this work, we extend the candidacy game model to the setting of multi...
| Egile Nagusiak: | , , , |
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| Formatua: | Conference item |
| Hizkuntza: | English |
| Argitaratua: |
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
2020
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| _version_ | 1826287984925736960 |
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| author | Obraztsova, S Polukarov, M Elkind, E Grzesiuk, M |
| author_facet | Obraztsova, S Polukarov, M Elkind, E Grzesiuk, M |
| author_sort | Obraztsova, S |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences over the set of possible election outcomes, and candidates may strategically withdraw from the election in order to manipulate the result in their favor. In this work, we extend the candidacy game model to the setting of multiwinner elections, where the goal is to select a fixed-size committee of candidates, rather than a single winner. We examine the existence and properties of Nash equilibria in the resulting class of games, under various voting rules and voter preference structures. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:06:53Z |
| format | Conference item |
| id | oxford-uuid:9f4d97f6-7dd6-44fa-b6f4-f5d8808e44c6 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:06:53Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publisher | International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:9f4d97f6-7dd6-44fa-b6f4-f5d8808e44c62022-03-27T00:56:34ZMultiwinner candidacy gamesConference itemhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794uuid:9f4d97f6-7dd6-44fa-b6f4-f5d8808e44c6EnglishSymplectic ElementsInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems2020Obraztsova, SPolukarov, MElkind, EGrzesiuk, MIn strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences over the set of possible election outcomes, and candidates may strategically withdraw from the election in order to manipulate the result in their favor. In this work, we extend the candidacy game model to the setting of multiwinner elections, where the goal is to select a fixed-size committee of candidates, rather than a single winner. We examine the existence and properties of Nash equilibria in the resulting class of games, under various voting rules and voter preference structures. |
| spellingShingle | Obraztsova, S Polukarov, M Elkind, E Grzesiuk, M Multiwinner candidacy games |
| title | Multiwinner candidacy games |
| title_full | Multiwinner candidacy games |
| title_fullStr | Multiwinner candidacy games |
| title_full_unstemmed | Multiwinner candidacy games |
| title_short | Multiwinner candidacy games |
| title_sort | multiwinner candidacy games |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT obraztsovas multiwinnercandidacygames AT polukarovm multiwinnercandidacygames AT elkinde multiwinnercandidacygames AT grzesiukm multiwinnercandidacygames |