Multiwinner candidacy games
In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences over the set of possible election outcomes, and candidates may strategically withdraw from the election in order to manipulate the result in their favor. In this work, we extend the candidacy game model to the setting of multi...
Hauptverfasser: | Obraztsova, S, Polukarov, M, Elkind, E, Grzesiuk, M |
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Format: | Conference item |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
2020
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