Aristotle on teleology, chance, and necessity
<p>In this doctoral thesis, I address questions concerning teleology, chance, and necessity in Aristotle's philosophy. These three concepts are closely related. Aristotle considers chance in relation to teleology, and contrasts his conception of teleology with his own and his predecessors...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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2015
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| _version_ | 1797107407958048768 |
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| author | Oki, T |
| author2 | Judson, L |
| author_facet | Judson, L Oki, T |
| author_sort | Oki, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>In this doctoral thesis, I address questions concerning teleology, chance, and necessity in Aristotle's philosophy. These three concepts are closely related. Aristotle considers chance in relation to teleology, and contrasts his conception of teleology with his own and his predecessors' views of necessity. He explains accidental causation on the basis of the absurdity of necessitarianism.</p> <p>In Chapter I, I clarify Aristotle's definitions of chance events and chance in <em>Physics</em> B 4-6 on the basis of a detailed examination of 'coming to be accidentally' (196b23), 'for the sake of something' (196b21), 'might be done by thought or by nature' (196b22). I analyze accidental and non-accidental relations involved in the marketplace example.</p> <p>In Chapter II, I argue that Aristotle accepts that the regularly beneficial winter rainfall is for the sake of the crops in <em>Physics</em> B 8. I scrutinize Empedocles’ view as described by Aristotle and show that it is not a theory of natural selection. I seek to show that the rival view against which Aristotle argues is an amalgam of reductionism and eliminativism.</p> <p>In Chapter III, I analyze what Aristotle means by 'simple necessity' and 'necessity on a hypothesis' (199b34-35), and argue that, in <em>Physics</em> B 9, he only acknowledges hypothetical necessity. Scrutinizing the wall example and Aristotle’s reply to it, I clarify his view of the relation between teleological causation and material necessity.</p> <p>In Chapter IV, I clarify Aristotle's conception of accidental causes, while taking his presentation of the necessitarian argument in <em>Metaphysics</em> E 3 as a reductio ad absurdum. I criticize the view that Aristotle himself accepts necessitation in this chapter. In doing so, I argue that, although this point is not explicitly stated in <em>Physics</em> B, Aristotle thinks that what is accidental is not necessary prior to its occurrence.</p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:15:38Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oxford-uuid:9f6e9f40-eb61-43a8-92d6-b3749820e738 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:15:38Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:9f6e9f40-eb61-43a8-92d6-b3749820e7382022-07-28T10:56:41ZAristotle on teleology, chance, and necessityThesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06uuid:9f6e9f40-eb61-43a8-92d6-b3749820e738Ancient philosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - Valet2015Oki, TJudson, L<p>In this doctoral thesis, I address questions concerning teleology, chance, and necessity in Aristotle's philosophy. These three concepts are closely related. Aristotle considers chance in relation to teleology, and contrasts his conception of teleology with his own and his predecessors' views of necessity. He explains accidental causation on the basis of the absurdity of necessitarianism.</p> <p>In Chapter I, I clarify Aristotle's definitions of chance events and chance in <em>Physics</em> B 4-6 on the basis of a detailed examination of 'coming to be accidentally' (196b23), 'for the sake of something' (196b21), 'might be done by thought or by nature' (196b22). I analyze accidental and non-accidental relations involved in the marketplace example.</p> <p>In Chapter II, I argue that Aristotle accepts that the regularly beneficial winter rainfall is for the sake of the crops in <em>Physics</em> B 8. I scrutinize Empedocles’ view as described by Aristotle and show that it is not a theory of natural selection. I seek to show that the rival view against which Aristotle argues is an amalgam of reductionism and eliminativism.</p> <p>In Chapter III, I analyze what Aristotle means by 'simple necessity' and 'necessity on a hypothesis' (199b34-35), and argue that, in <em>Physics</em> B 9, he only acknowledges hypothetical necessity. Scrutinizing the wall example and Aristotle’s reply to it, I clarify his view of the relation between teleological causation and material necessity.</p> <p>In Chapter IV, I clarify Aristotle's conception of accidental causes, while taking his presentation of the necessitarian argument in <em>Metaphysics</em> E 3 as a reductio ad absurdum. I criticize the view that Aristotle himself accepts necessitation in this chapter. In doing so, I argue that, although this point is not explicitly stated in <em>Physics</em> B, Aristotle thinks that what is accidental is not necessary prior to its occurrence.</p> |
| spellingShingle | Ancient philosophy Oki, T Aristotle on teleology, chance, and necessity |
| title | Aristotle on teleology, chance, and necessity |
| title_full | Aristotle on teleology, chance, and necessity |
| title_fullStr | Aristotle on teleology, chance, and necessity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Aristotle on teleology, chance, and necessity |
| title_short | Aristotle on teleology, chance, and necessity |
| title_sort | aristotle on teleology chance and necessity |
| topic | Ancient philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT okit aristotleonteleologychanceandnecessity |