A note on satisfaction, truth and the empty domain
An attractive principle about domains of quantification is the analogue of the Separation Axiom in set theory: restricting a domain by an arbitrary predicate yields a domain. In particular, restricting a domain by a predicate that applies to nothing yields a domain. Thus if there is a nonempty domai...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Blackwell Publishing
1999
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| Summary: | An attractive principle about domains of quantification is the analogue of the Separation Axiom in set theory: restricting a domain by an arbitrary predicate yields a domain. In particular, restricting a domain by a predicate that applies to nothing yields a domain. Thus if there is a nonempty domain, there is an empty domain. But semantics for the empty domain involves some neglected subtleties. Untangling them requires us to revise the usual definition of truth in a model, avoiding the detour through Tarski's notion of satisfaction. |
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