| Resumo: | The existence of the phenomenon of ineffability enjoys wide recognition, and numerous examples can be found in the contexts of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of religion, and philosophical aesthetics. At the same time, however, its philosophical significance is largely denied, which explains the lack of literature on the topic. My thesis aims to fill this gap by offering a systematic account of the metaphysics of ineffability. The structure of the thesis is as follows. After providing some core definitions, the paper proceeds to examine what, if anything, could qualify as an ineffable entity. Three candidates are examined (‘ineffable truths’, ‘ineffable content’ and ‘ineffable knowledge’), the first two of which are rejected, the third of which is endorsed. In the discussion of ineffable truths, I challenge arguments for what I call ‘fugitive’ and ‘excess’ propositions. In the discussion of ineffable content, I challenge the notion of nonconceptual content in the contexts of perception and aesthetics. In the discussion of ineffable knowledge, I clarify to what extent arguments for the distinctness of knowledge-how from knowledge-that can help elucidate ineffability. Finally, I endorse A.W. Moore’s argument for the existence of ineffable knowledge and apply it to the initial examples of ineffability. I conclude that the phenomenon of ineffability must be explained in terms of ineffable knowledge.
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