Unreflective realism
"Truth and Objectivity" is full of ideas. Only a few of them will be discussed here. First, I consider the book's use of the notion of the a priori, and raise some problems for it. The trouble is then diagnosed as resulting from a preconception about semantics, one also connected with...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley-Blackwell
1996
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| _version_ | 1826288127131516928 |
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| author | Williamson, T |
| author2 | International Phenomenological Society |
| author_facet | International Phenomenological Society Williamson, T |
| author_sort | Williamson, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | "Truth and Objectivity" is full of ideas. Only a few of them will be discussed here. First, I consider the book's use of the notion of the a priori, and raise some problems for it. The trouble is then diagnosed as resulting from a preconception about semantics, one also connected with Wright's claim that, in disputes between realists and their opponents, the burden of proof always lies on the former. To put it crudely, the preconception is that it is the responsibility of participants in a discourse to fix its status; it attains objectivity only if they do something special to bring that about. An alternative will be suggested, on which realist content can arise by default. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:09:02Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:9ff70cd1-d96b-42b6-a3fe-2d83b970295b |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:09:02Z |
| publishDate | 1996 |
| publisher | Wiley-Blackwell |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:9ff70cd1-d96b-42b6-a3fe-2d83b970295b2022-03-27T02:01:58ZUnreflective realismJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:9ff70cd1-d96b-42b6-a3fe-2d83b970295bPhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetWiley-Blackwell1996Williamson, TInternational Phenomenological Society"Truth and Objectivity" is full of ideas. Only a few of them will be discussed here. First, I consider the book's use of the notion of the a priori, and raise some problems for it. The trouble is then diagnosed as resulting from a preconception about semantics, one also connected with Wright's claim that, in disputes between realists and their opponents, the burden of proof always lies on the former. To put it crudely, the preconception is that it is the responsibility of participants in a discourse to fix its status; it attains objectivity only if they do something special to bring that about. An alternative will be suggested, on which realist content can arise by default. |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Williamson, T Unreflective realism |
| title | Unreflective realism |
| title_full | Unreflective realism |
| title_fullStr | Unreflective realism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Unreflective realism |
| title_short | Unreflective realism |
| title_sort | unreflective realism |
| topic | Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT williamsont unreflectiverealism |