International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax
This paper investigates the incentives for countries to implement and maintain the global minimum tax introduced by the G20/OECD’s Inclusive Framework 2021 agreement: Pillar 2. It argues that the agreement has sufficient elements to create incentives for large headquarters countries to implement it....
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
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University of Chicago Press
2023
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author | Devereux, MP |
author_facet | Devereux, MP |
author_sort | Devereux, MP |
collection | OXFORD |
description | This paper investigates the incentives for countries to implement and maintain the global minimum tax introduced by the G20/OECD’s Inclusive Framework 2021 agreement: Pillar 2. It argues that the agreement has sufficient elements to create incentives for large headquarters countries to implement it. Conditional on them doing so, there is an incentive for host countries to follow suit. The agreement would put a significant floor on tax competition. However, there are caveats to this argument in terms of complexity and the incentive to maintain some provisions that are likely to raise little revenue. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-25T04:32:12Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:a0980f67-237b-4adf-bf39-588455b192f5 |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-09T03:24:11Z |
publishDate | 2023 |
publisher | University of Chicago Press |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:a0980f67-237b-4adf-bf39-588455b192f52024-11-26T11:27:32ZInternational tax competition and coordination with a global minimum taxJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:a0980f67-237b-4adf-bf39-588455b192f5EnglishSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Chicago Press2023Devereux, MPThis paper investigates the incentives for countries to implement and maintain the global minimum tax introduced by the G20/OECD’s Inclusive Framework 2021 agreement: Pillar 2. It argues that the agreement has sufficient elements to create incentives for large headquarters countries to implement it. Conditional on them doing so, there is an incentive for host countries to follow suit. The agreement would put a significant floor on tax competition. However, there are caveats to this argument in terms of complexity and the incentive to maintain some provisions that are likely to raise little revenue. |
spellingShingle | Devereux, MP International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax |
title | International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax |
title_full | International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax |
title_fullStr | International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax |
title_full_unstemmed | International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax |
title_short | International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax |
title_sort | international tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax |
work_keys_str_mv | AT devereuxmp internationaltaxcompetitionandcoordinationwithaglobalminimumtax |