International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax

This paper investigates the incentives for countries to implement and maintain the global minimum tax introduced by the G20/OECD’s Inclusive Framework 2021 agreement: Pillar 2. It argues that the agreement has sufficient elements to create incentives for large headquarters countries to implement it....

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Main Author: Devereux, MP
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: University of Chicago Press 2023
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author Devereux, MP
author_facet Devereux, MP
author_sort Devereux, MP
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description This paper investigates the incentives for countries to implement and maintain the global minimum tax introduced by the G20/OECD’s Inclusive Framework 2021 agreement: Pillar 2. It argues that the agreement has sufficient elements to create incentives for large headquarters countries to implement it. Conditional on them doing so, there is an incentive for host countries to follow suit. The agreement would put a significant floor on tax competition. However, there are caveats to this argument in terms of complexity and the incentive to maintain some provisions that are likely to raise little revenue.
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spelling oxford-uuid:a0980f67-237b-4adf-bf39-588455b192f52024-11-26T11:27:32ZInternational tax competition and coordination with a global minimum taxJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:a0980f67-237b-4adf-bf39-588455b192f5EnglishSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Chicago Press2023Devereux, MPThis paper investigates the incentives for countries to implement and maintain the global minimum tax introduced by the G20/OECD’s Inclusive Framework 2021 agreement: Pillar 2. It argues that the agreement has sufficient elements to create incentives for large headquarters countries to implement it. Conditional on them doing so, there is an incentive for host countries to follow suit. The agreement would put a significant floor on tax competition. However, there are caveats to this argument in terms of complexity and the incentive to maintain some provisions that are likely to raise little revenue.
spellingShingle Devereux, MP
International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax
title International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax
title_full International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax
title_fullStr International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax
title_full_unstemmed International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax
title_short International tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax
title_sort international tax competition and coordination with a global minimum tax
work_keys_str_mv AT devereuxmp internationaltaxcompetitionandcoordinationwithaglobalminimumtax