Consciousness ain’t all that
<p>Most philosophers think that phenomenal consciousness underlies, or at any rate makes a large contribution, to moral considerability. This paper argues that many such accounts invoke question-begging arguments. Moreover, they’re unable to explain apparent differences in moral status across...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer
2024
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| _version_ | 1811140051544834048 |
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| author | Levy, N |
| author_facet | Levy, N |
| author_sort | Levy, N |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>Most philosophers think that phenomenal consciousness underlies, or at any rate makes a large contribution, to moral considerability. This paper argues that many such accounts invoke question-begging arguments. Moreover, they’re unable to explain apparent differences in moral status across and within different species. In the light of these problems, I argue that we ought to take very seriously a view according to which moral considerability is grounded in functional properties. Phenomenal consciousness may be sufficient for having a moral value, but it may not be necessary, and it may contribute relatively little to our overall considerability.</p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-25T04:15:50Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:a12d5c1d-a843-4fb2-afe3-05e9f8a8bcdd |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-25T04:15:50Z |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:a12d5c1d-a843-4fb2-afe3-05e9f8a8bcdd2024-07-16T12:42:28ZConsciousness ain’t all thatJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:a12d5c1d-a843-4fb2-afe3-05e9f8a8bcddEnglishSymplectic ElementsSpringer2024Levy, N<p>Most philosophers think that phenomenal consciousness underlies, or at any rate makes a large contribution, to moral considerability. This paper argues that many such accounts invoke question-begging arguments. Moreover, they’re unable to explain apparent differences in moral status across and within different species. In the light of these problems, I argue that we ought to take very seriously a view according to which moral considerability is grounded in functional properties. Phenomenal consciousness may be sufficient for having a moral value, but it may not be necessary, and it may contribute relatively little to our overall considerability.</p> |
| spellingShingle | Levy, N Consciousness ain’t all that |
| title | Consciousness ain’t all that |
| title_full | Consciousness ain’t all that |
| title_fullStr | Consciousness ain’t all that |
| title_full_unstemmed | Consciousness ain’t all that |
| title_short | Consciousness ain’t all that |
| title_sort | consciousness ain t all that |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT levyn consciousnessaintallthat |