Reasoning and normativity
<p>This thesis addresses three questions: (I) What is theoretical and practical reasoning? (II) What is it to respond to normative reasons? (III) What are standards of evaluation for reasoning? Regarding (I), I first critically assess two views which have recently dominated the debate on the n...
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| Бусад зохиолчид: | |
| Формат: | Дипломын ажил |
| Хэл сонгох: | English |
| Хэвлэсэн: |
2020
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| Нөхцлүүд: |
| _version_ | 1826311963037138944 |
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| author | Poprawe, FF |
| author2 | Broome, J |
| author_facet | Broome, J Poprawe, FF |
| author_sort | Poprawe, FF |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>This thesis addresses three questions: (I) What is theoretical and practical reasoning? (II) What is it to respond to normative reasons? (III) What are standards of evaluation for reasoning? Regarding (I), I first critically assess two views which have recently dominated the debate on the nature of the mental activity of reasoning. I argue that different versions of the Rule-Following View, according to which reasoning is essentially a rule-following activity, are problematic. Further, I argue that the Reasons View, which holds that reasoning consists in responding to normative reasons, is assumed by many but defended by few and remains underdeveloped. In particular, it is explanatorily unsatisfactory because, while it explains reasoning in terms of responding to normative reasons, it lacks an account of what it is to respond to normative reasons. I then provide a new theory of the nature of reasoning, the Approval Account. Reasoning is a transition in thought from some attitudes to another which the agent approves of. Regarding question (II), I propose a novel account of what it is to respond to normative reasons: it is a mental process that leads an agent from some attitudes to a response, where this process manifests the agent’s implicit conception of what is right to believe and do, and is under the agent’s (virtual) control. This account of responding to reasons allows me to systematically establish the claim that reasoning is a way of responding to normative reasons. With regards to question (III), it follows that correct reasoning is correctly responding to (supposed) normative reasons. I further argue that we must distinguish between the correctness, the goodness and the aim of reasoning. </p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:19:02Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oxford-uuid:a1f93c8d-74c3-4314-a457-c3e3cc89c5b7 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:19:02Z |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:a1f93c8d-74c3-4314-a457-c3e3cc89c5b72024-01-16T07:37:10ZReasoning and normativityThesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06uuid:a1f93c8d-74c3-4314-a457-c3e3cc89c5b7PhilosophyEnglishHyrax Deposit2020Poprawe, FFBroome, JBader, R<p>This thesis addresses three questions: (I) What is theoretical and practical reasoning? (II) What is it to respond to normative reasons? (III) What are standards of evaluation for reasoning? Regarding (I), I first critically assess two views which have recently dominated the debate on the nature of the mental activity of reasoning. I argue that different versions of the Rule-Following View, according to which reasoning is essentially a rule-following activity, are problematic. Further, I argue that the Reasons View, which holds that reasoning consists in responding to normative reasons, is assumed by many but defended by few and remains underdeveloped. In particular, it is explanatorily unsatisfactory because, while it explains reasoning in terms of responding to normative reasons, it lacks an account of what it is to respond to normative reasons. I then provide a new theory of the nature of reasoning, the Approval Account. Reasoning is a transition in thought from some attitudes to another which the agent approves of. Regarding question (II), I propose a novel account of what it is to respond to normative reasons: it is a mental process that leads an agent from some attitudes to a response, where this process manifests the agent’s implicit conception of what is right to believe and do, and is under the agent’s (virtual) control. This account of responding to reasons allows me to systematically establish the claim that reasoning is a way of responding to normative reasons. With regards to question (III), it follows that correct reasoning is correctly responding to (supposed) normative reasons. I further argue that we must distinguish between the correctness, the goodness and the aim of reasoning. </p> |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Poprawe, FF Reasoning and normativity |
| title | Reasoning and normativity |
| title_full | Reasoning and normativity |
| title_fullStr | Reasoning and normativity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reasoning and normativity |
| title_short | Reasoning and normativity |
| title_sort | reasoning and normativity |
| topic | Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT popraweff reasoningandnormativity |