Understanding individual differences in theory of mind via representation of minds, not mental states
The human ability to make inferences about the minds of conspecifics is remarkable. The majority of work in this area focuses on mental state representation (‘theory of mind’), but has had limited success in explaining individual differences in this ability, and is characterized by the lack of a the...
Автори: | Conway, J, Catmur, C, Bird, G |
---|---|
Формат: | Journal article |
Опубліковано: |
Springer US
2019
|
Схожі ресурси
Схожі ресурси
-
Novel theory of mind task demonstrates representation of minds in mental state inference
за авторством: Long, E, та інші
Опубліковано: (2022) -
Novel theory of mind task demonstrates representation of minds in mental state inference
за авторством: Emily L. Long, та інші
Опубліковано: (2022-12-01) -
Poorer representation of minds underpins less accurate mental state inference for out-groups
за авторством: Payne, B, та інші
Опубліковано: (2024) -
Understanding how minds vary relates to skill in inferring mental states, personality, and intelligence
за авторством: Conway, J, та інші
Опубліковано: (2019) -
Poorer representation of minds underpins less accurate mental state inference for out-groups
за авторством: Bryony Payne, та інші
Опубліковано: (2024-08-01)