Understanding individual differences in theory of mind via representation of minds, not mental states
The human ability to make inferences about the minds of conspecifics is remarkable. The majority of work in this area focuses on mental state representation (‘theory of mind’), but has had limited success in explaining individual differences in this ability, and is characterized by the lack of a the...
Main Authors: | Conway, J, Catmur, C, Bird, G |
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Format: | Journal article |
Izdano: |
Springer US
2019
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