Investor activism and financial market structure
This article investigates investor activism when there are a number of strategic investors that are capable of intervening in corporate governance. These strategic investors can monitor and/or trade in anonymous financial markets. In equilibrium, a core group of monitoring investors emerges endogeno...
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| Format: | Journal article |
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2002
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| _version_ | 1826288812082331648 |
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| author | Noe, T |
| author_facet | Noe, T |
| author_sort | Noe, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | This article investigates investor activism when there are a number of strategic investors that are capable of intervening in corporate governance. These strategic investors can monitor and/or trade in anonymous financial markets. In equilibrium, a core group of monitoring investors emerges endogenously to curtail managerial opportunism. These core activists both intervene and trade aggressively. Although the smallest investors are passive, there is no monotonic relationship between the size of preexisting shareholdings and activism. In fact, among those investors who choose activism, those with the smallest holdings are the most aggressive. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:19:21Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:a35f269e-f28b-4043-bf47-504f64d88bbc |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:19:21Z |
| publishDate | 2002 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:a35f269e-f28b-4043-bf47-504f64d88bbc2022-03-27T02:26:28ZInvestor activism and financial market structureJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:a35f269e-f28b-4043-bf47-504f64d88bbcSaïd Business School - Eureka2002Noe, TThis article investigates investor activism when there are a number of strategic investors that are capable of intervening in corporate governance. These strategic investors can monitor and/or trade in anonymous financial markets. In equilibrium, a core group of monitoring investors emerges endogenously to curtail managerial opportunism. These core activists both intervene and trade aggressively. Although the smallest investors are passive, there is no monotonic relationship between the size of preexisting shareholdings and activism. In fact, among those investors who choose activism, those with the smallest holdings are the most aggressive. |
| spellingShingle | Noe, T Investor activism and financial market structure |
| title | Investor activism and financial market structure |
| title_full | Investor activism and financial market structure |
| title_fullStr | Investor activism and financial market structure |
| title_full_unstemmed | Investor activism and financial market structure |
| title_short | Investor activism and financial market structure |
| title_sort | investor activism and financial market structure |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT noet investoractivismandfinancialmarketstructure |