Transparency and deliberation within the FOMC: a computational linguistics approach

How does transparency, a key feature of central bank design, affect monetary policymakers’ deliberations? Theory predicts a positive discipline effect and negative conformity effect. We empirically explore these effects using a natural experiment in the Federal Open Market Committee in 1993 and comp...

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Autors principals: Hansen, S, McMahon, M, Prat, A
Format: Journal article
Publicat: Oxford University Press 2017
Descripció
Sumari:How does transparency, a key feature of central bank design, affect monetary policymakers’ deliberations? Theory predicts a positive discipline effect and negative conformity effect. We empirically explore these effects using a natural experiment in the Federal Open Market Committee in 1993 and computational linguistics algorithms. We first find large changes in communication patterns after transparency. We then propose a difference-in-differences approach inspired by the career concerns literature, and find evidence for both effects. Finally, we construct an influence measure that suggests the discipline effect dominates.