The Case for an Independent European Central Bank: A Reassessment of Evidence and Sources.
The European Commission, drawing on much other research, has made an influential empirical case for central bank independence. In this paper, their evidence and the research on which it is based are scrutinised. There is shown to be considerable doubt as to whether the procedures for the measurement...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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1998
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| _version_ | 1826288964703617024 |
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| author | Forder, J |
| author_facet | Forder, J |
| author_sort | Forder, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The European Commission, drawing on much other research, has made an influential empirical case for central bank independence. In this paper, their evidence and the research on which it is based are scrutinised. There is shown to be considerable doubt as to whether the procedures for the measurement of independence are either worth much in themselves, or whether they were correctly followed. Yet the Commission gave the results an interpretation very favourable to the hypothesis that central bank independence improves economic performance. A reconsideration of the research shows no basis for such a conclusion. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:21:41Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:a4234ab8-8955-48f0-9e91-1664cd66f991 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T02:21:41Z |
| publishDate | 1998 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:a4234ab8-8955-48f0-9e91-1664cd66f9912022-03-27T02:31:51ZThe Case for an Independent European Central Bank: A Reassessment of Evidence and Sources.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:a4234ab8-8955-48f0-9e91-1664cd66f991EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints1998Forder, JThe European Commission, drawing on much other research, has made an influential empirical case for central bank independence. In this paper, their evidence and the research on which it is based are scrutinised. There is shown to be considerable doubt as to whether the procedures for the measurement of independence are either worth much in themselves, or whether they were correctly followed. Yet the Commission gave the results an interpretation very favourable to the hypothesis that central bank independence improves economic performance. A reconsideration of the research shows no basis for such a conclusion. |
| spellingShingle | Forder, J The Case for an Independent European Central Bank: A Reassessment of Evidence and Sources. |
| title | The Case for an Independent European Central Bank: A Reassessment of Evidence and Sources. |
| title_full | The Case for an Independent European Central Bank: A Reassessment of Evidence and Sources. |
| title_fullStr | The Case for an Independent European Central Bank: A Reassessment of Evidence and Sources. |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Case for an Independent European Central Bank: A Reassessment of Evidence and Sources. |
| title_short | The Case for an Independent European Central Bank: A Reassessment of Evidence and Sources. |
| title_sort | case for an independent european central bank a reassessment of evidence and sources |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT forderj thecaseforanindependenteuropeancentralbankareassessmentofevidenceandsources AT forderj caseforanindependenteuropeancentralbankareassessmentofevidenceandsources |