The good consideration rule: an enrichment explanation
<p>This thesis investigates what the correct justification in principle for the good consideration rule is. It concludes that the answer to that enquiry lies within the elements that complete a cause of action in unjust enrichment. On the best interpretation, the good consideration rule is an...
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Format: | Thesis |
Language: | English |
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2014
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author | Kizhakkevalappil, K |
author2 | Stevens, R |
author_facet | Stevens, R Kizhakkevalappil, K |
author_sort | Kizhakkevalappil, K |
collection | OXFORD |
description | <p>This thesis investigates what the correct justification in principle for the good consideration rule is. It concludes that the answer to that enquiry lies within the elements that complete a cause of action in unjust enrichment. On the best interpretation, the good consideration rule is an enrichment qualification. The defendant’s prima facie enrichment through the receipt of a benefit is balanced off by the discharge of an obligation owed to the defendant. In net terms therefore, the defendant is not enriched. However, this reasoning is conditional on the acceptance of two prior premises.</p> <p>First, the good consideration rule and the legal obligation qualification are distinct restrictions on claims in unjust enrichment. Two features in particular distinguish them: (<b>a</b>) the operation of a legal obligation <em>between the claimant and the defendant;</em> (<b>b</b>) the fact that the payment was <em>intended</em> to discharge a debt owed to the defendant. This thesis concerns the good consideration rule alone.</p> <p>Secondly, in evaluating the defendant’s enrichment, conditionally related disenrichments must be accounted for (the ‘net benefit approach’). Thus, when the defendant receives a benefit on the condition shared between the parties that the defendant will in turn suffer a disenrichment, the defendant’s true enrichment is the difference between those values.</p> <p>At first blush, there are at least three major objections to the enrichment thesis — the decision of the High Court of Australia in <em>Roxborough</em>, the House of Lords’ decision in <em>Deutsche Morgan</em> and the law on restitution of mistaken payments made to discharge unenforceable debts. On closer examination however, all three can be overcome.</p> <p>Finally, the enrichment thesis fares better than its rival explanations in accounting for the features of the good consideration rule. The ensuing doctrinal consequences are also largely in line with the prevalent judicial and academic thinking on the good consideration rule.</p> |
first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:15:41Z |
format | Thesis |
id | oxford-uuid:a77ac5c8-f862-4990-a3ba-599a60eeee16 |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:15:41Z |
publishDate | 2014 |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:a77ac5c8-f862-4990-a3ba-599a60eeee162022-08-10T12:10:56ZThe good consideration rule: an enrichment explanationThesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdccuuid:a77ac5c8-f862-4990-a3ba-599a60eeee16Contract,restitution,tortLawEnglishOxford University Research Archive - Valet2014Kizhakkevalappil, KStevens, R<p>This thesis investigates what the correct justification in principle for the good consideration rule is. It concludes that the answer to that enquiry lies within the elements that complete a cause of action in unjust enrichment. On the best interpretation, the good consideration rule is an enrichment qualification. The defendant’s prima facie enrichment through the receipt of a benefit is balanced off by the discharge of an obligation owed to the defendant. In net terms therefore, the defendant is not enriched. However, this reasoning is conditional on the acceptance of two prior premises.</p> <p>First, the good consideration rule and the legal obligation qualification are distinct restrictions on claims in unjust enrichment. Two features in particular distinguish them: (<b>a</b>) the operation of a legal obligation <em>between the claimant and the defendant;</em> (<b>b</b>) the fact that the payment was <em>intended</em> to discharge a debt owed to the defendant. This thesis concerns the good consideration rule alone.</p> <p>Secondly, in evaluating the defendant’s enrichment, conditionally related disenrichments must be accounted for (the ‘net benefit approach’). Thus, when the defendant receives a benefit on the condition shared between the parties that the defendant will in turn suffer a disenrichment, the defendant’s true enrichment is the difference between those values.</p> <p>At first blush, there are at least three major objections to the enrichment thesis — the decision of the High Court of Australia in <em>Roxborough</em>, the House of Lords’ decision in <em>Deutsche Morgan</em> and the law on restitution of mistaken payments made to discharge unenforceable debts. On closer examination however, all three can be overcome.</p> <p>Finally, the enrichment thesis fares better than its rival explanations in accounting for the features of the good consideration rule. The ensuing doctrinal consequences are also largely in line with the prevalent judicial and academic thinking on the good consideration rule.</p> |
spellingShingle | Contract,restitution,tort Law Kizhakkevalappil, K The good consideration rule: an enrichment explanation |
title | The good consideration rule: an enrichment explanation |
title_full | The good consideration rule: an enrichment explanation |
title_fullStr | The good consideration rule: an enrichment explanation |
title_full_unstemmed | The good consideration rule: an enrichment explanation |
title_short | The good consideration rule: an enrichment explanation |
title_sort | good consideration rule an enrichment explanation |
topic | Contract,restitution,tort Law |
work_keys_str_mv | AT kizhakkevalappilk thegoodconsiderationruleanenrichmentexplanation AT kizhakkevalappilk goodconsiderationruleanenrichmentexplanation |