Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
<p>Prior-free auctions are robust auctions that assume no distribution over bidders’ valuations and provide worst-case (input-by-input) approximation guarantees. In contrast to previous work on this topic, we pursue good prior-free auctions with non-identical bidders.</p> <p>Prior...
Main Authors: | Bhattacharya, S, Koutsoupias, E, Kulkarni, J, Leonardi, S, Roughgarden, T, Xu, X |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Elsevier
2020
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